THE BALANCE BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE POWER: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW*
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N REVOLUTIONARY periods, the real political issues are frequently obscured by the persistent application of an obsolete scientific
terminology which denotes attitudes and patterns of behavior no
longer in conformity with actual conditions. Particularly in political theory the use of traditional terms may be misleading and confusing. The
postulate of a balance or equilibrium between legislative and executive
powers' reveals its ancestry from the customary tri-partite division of
state activities into the legislative, executive, and judicial functions traditionally associated with Montesquieu. Any realistic discussion, therefore,
of what has become, in these recent years, the crucial issue of government
and constitutional law needs clarification of terms. In its original meaning
the doctrine of the separation of powers signifies and determines, by contrast and juxtaposition, the component parts of state power under the assumption of a static system which, in the spirit of the age when it was
formulated, organizes the activities of the state by way of a division be* This article is in substance the enlarged and annotated version of an address presented
by the author at the Second International Congress of Comparative Law at the Hague on
August 5, i937; it covers developments to May 1, 1938.
f Professor of Political Science, Amherst College.
I The most up-to-date bibliography on contemporary political organization in general
and on the problems concerning the relationship between legislative and executive in particular
is to be found in tome x of the Encyclop~die Frangaise, l'Etat moderne (i935) (cited hereafter, E.F.; the figure quoted indicates the "fascicule," not the page, according to the division
of the volume; the name added is that of the individual author; literature is contained in the
appendix io. B-i ff.); see io64.I-4 (Gordon). Compare Barth~lemy, Le role du pouvoir excutif
dans les r~publiques modernes (1907); Dendias, Le renforcement des pouvoirs du chef de
1'6tat dans les d6mocraties parlementaries (1932); Dendias, Le chef de l'6tat r~publicain et le
rajustement de l'ex~cutif (au seuil de la dictature) (1937); Gordon, Les nouvelles constitutions europ~ennes et le role du chef de l'6tat (1932); Mirkine-Guetz6vich, Les nouvelies tendances du droit constitutionnel (2d ed. 1936); Barth6lemy-Duez, Trait6 du droit constitutionnel (1933), 252 ff., 6o4 ff.; Esmein-N6zard, Elements du droit constituionnel frangais et
compar6 457 ff. (7th ed. 1921); Finer, Theory and Practice of Moder Government 949 ff.
(1932).

Much valuable material is scattered also in Friedrich, Constitutional Government and
Politics (1937); see, however, the reservations made by Loewenstein, 31 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev.
953 ff. (1937).
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tween or distribution among different human agencies within the same
national unit of political administration. More as political ideology than
as a standard of actual political organization the doctrine that the political
powers of the state should be, by necessity, distinguished and separated in
accordance with the objectives of state activities has served its purpose in
the twilight period between the absolute monarchy and the fully developed constitutional state.
The present political situation, however, is characterized most decidedly by the fact that all states, whether constitutional, authoritarian or dictatorial, demonstrate the existence and necessity of a political dynamism
which amounts in practice to a more or less complete merger of the legislative and executive functions. In consequence thereof, the traditional
substantive or qualitative distinction between the law-making function,
that is the drafting, enacting and sanctioning of the law, and the. executive, that is the actual application of the law by way of administration,
has been superseded, to a large extent, by the quantitative political ascendancy of the executive. The government integrates the will of the
state as reflected both by legislation and administration. Thus today executive activities no longer confine their scope exclusively to the application of the statutes and to general administration, but have grown into
the general political functions of the government for which enactment and
application of the law are only incidental instrumentalities of political
power as such. In this sense, the traditional statics of state activity have
become submerged, in our time, in what one may call appropriately
though unscientifically political leadership. It is evident that to Montesquieu's theory governmental decisions and actions transcending the functional division, for which the French doctrine coined the term "acres de
gouvernement," would be irrelevant.2
2 By the term of "actes de gouvernement," a notion more or less unknown in this country, is

meant the totality of political acts of the government not subjected to control of courts or
other agencies of the state. In reaction to the extreme rationalization of political power during
the nineteenth century in recent years the range of discretionary action of the government has
been constantly enlarged. Continental constitutional jurisprudence and practice allows for an
increasingly broad sphere of merely political decision of the government. In the United States,
where the tendency prevails of establishing a maximum of judicial control over the administrative activities, the "political questions" may come relatively close to the European term of
"atde de gouvernerment"; see Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549 (1913); Ex parte Cooper, 143 U.S. 472
(x89x). It is scarcely surprising that the National Socialist doctrine capitalized, although
rather late, on such a convenient notion as a dogmatic groundwork for the irresponsibility of
the leadership principle; see Ipsen, Politik und Justiz (i937).
For a general discussion of the "actes de gouvernement" see Duez, Les actes de gouvernement
(935); Gros, Survivance de la raison d'etat 11o6.14 (Corneille) (1932). The problem was well
realized by Locke in his Essay on Civil Government, ch. XI-XIII in the emphasis placed on
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I. A REALISTIC RE-EXAMINATION OF
MONTESQUIEU'S DOCTRINE
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES

The doctrine of the separation and its attendant postulate of the mutual checks of powers, already known under the qualification of "mixed
government" to the ancients, 3 became an ideal pattern of political organization in the eighteenth century, more precisely in the period between
the Glorious Revolution in England of 1688 and the French Revolution
of 1789. Elaborated by John Locke 4 for the ex post facto justification for
the Whig compromise between the parliament and the prerogative of the
Crown which, by that time, had been reduced from royal absolutism to
constitutional functionalism, the doctrine was cast into its definite shape
by Montesquieu.5 Incidentally, as a member of the aristocracy de robe,
the president of the court of Bordeaux was deeply interested in the defense of traditional rights of the judiciary branch against the Crown.
It is here beside the point to emphasize that Montesquieu either deliberately idealized or unintentionally misinterpreted contemporary British
the discretionary power of the "Prerogative." While Montesquieu's arrangement which
attributes to the executive the function of "d'executer les resolutionspubliques" (Esprit des
lois, book XI, chapter 6) implies the strict dependence of the government on previous commands of the legislature.
3Aristotle, Polybius, Thomas Aquinas; Harrington and Bolingbroke in England. See de
la Bigne de Villeneuve, La fin du principe de la s6paration des pouvoirs 9 ff.(1934) The once
much discussed classification of states or governments, today a rather stale topic, is, in the
last analysis, the teleological version of the justification of "mixed" government as corresponding best to human nature.
4 On Locke's contribution to the doctrine see de la Bigne de Villeneuve op. cit. supra
note 3, at 16 ff.
5The literature on Montesquieu is immense. Although no efforts have been spared by constitutional lawyers to stretch his loose terminology to the utmost, the real approach can be
found not through legal but only through sociological interpretation. In addition to de la
Bigne de Villeneuve, op. cit., supranote 3, see the following selection of references: Duguit, La
separation des pouvoirs et l'assembl~e nationale de 1789 (1893); Barth~lemy and Duez, op. cit.,
supra note i,Esmein-N~zard, op. cit. supra note 1,493 if. (8th ed. 1927); Girons, Essai sur
la separation des pouvoirs dans l'ordre politique, administrative et judiciaire (i881); Levin,
The Political Doctrines of Montesquieu's Esprit des lois (1936) (with elaborate bibliography as
to the classical background); Carr6 de Malberg, Contributions . la th~orie g~nrale de l'6tat,
p. 2 ff.
(1926); Eisenmann, L'Esprit deslois et la separation des pouvoirs, in: M6langes Carr6 de
Malberg, p. 165 ff.
(i933); Haikal, Le President du Conseil et 'fvolutiondu r6gime parlementaire en France 3 if. (1937); Loewenstein, Volk und Parlament nach der Staatstheorie der
franz6sischen Nationalsammlung von 1789 (1922), passim; Zweig, Die Lehre vome pouvoir
constituant, 62 ff.(1909); i Finer, Theory and Practice of Modem Government 153 ff.
(1932); E.F. 1063.7 (H. Puget).
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institutions6 in that in England of the eighteenth century the cabinet
system with its implications of political parties and ministerial responsibility was already clearly in the making. It should be borne in mind,
however, that the ominous term, separation of powers, is nowhere found
expressis verbis in Montesquieu's famous Chapter 6 of Book XI of
L'Esprit des lois; on the contrary, it is stressed that the powers must collaborate: "Le pouvoir arrgte le pouvoir." What is even more important
is the fact that the doctrine, whether its historical derivation was true or
false, served hereafter as a ramrod against royal absolutism both in Europe and beyond the seas. Thus a historical misunderstanding became the
foundation of the constitutions on the North American continent.7 Here
the dogma has retained its spell to our own day. Some of the most important parts of the so-called New Deal of the present administration have
been invalidated recently by arguments which seem to be drawn directly
from Montesquieu's rigid postulate of a strict confinement of the executive and legislative functions to their proper spheres. 8 Under the influence
of traditionalist conceptions which are so surprisingly frequent in this
country, 9 the United States stands out today as the only state in which a
clear balance between legislative and executive powers has been maintained constitutionally. This dogmatic tenacity, upheld even in the face
of fundamental changes in economic structure and social thought, is perhaps one of the explanations why this country, otherwise unusually fortunate in its pragmatic constitutionalism, experiences today what some
consider to be a major constitutional crisis. Thus the postulate of functional dualism, implying the equilibrium between the powers, is on trial
even in the country which exemplifies the doctrine kath'exochen.
6 See Dedieu, Montesquieu et la tradition politique anglaise en France (igog); Carcassonne,
Montesquieu et le probl~me de la constitution frangaise au 'ime sicle (1928); Klimovsky,
Die englische Gewaltenteilungslehre bis zu Montesquieu (1927). Compare also Montesquieu's
own observations in Book X ch. 6 of the Esprit des lois.

7 On the influence of Montesquieu on the American constitutions (state and federal) see
i Finer, op. cit. supranote 5, at x62 ff.; Federalist, Nos. XLVII and XLVIII ("the oracle which

is always consulted and cited on this subject"). Wright, A Sourcebook of American Political
Theory, 282 ff., 343 if. (1929); Erlick, La s6paration des pouvoirs et la constitution f~d~rale de
8787 (1936). Knust, Montesquieu und die Verfassungen der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
(1922).

8A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,

529

(1935); Panama

Refining Corporation v. Ryan, 295 U.S. 388, 414 (1935).
9For more recent criticism of the separation and the checks and balances doctrine see:
Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 Mich. L. Rev. i (r923); Powell, Separation of Powers,
27 Pol. Sc. Q. 193 ff. (1912); Powell, Separation of Powers, 28 Pol. Sc. 0. 34 if. (1913).
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FAILURE OF PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE THEORY IN EUROPE

On the other hand, attempts in Europe to operate a state in terms of
the strict separation of powers were shortlived, as evidenced by the French
constitution of 1791.0 By some sort of inherent necessity the technique of
government, bent upon achieving the unity of the will of the state, led to
the system of mutual interaction of and reciprocal interdependence between the legislative and the executive which is generally spoken of as the
parliamentary system. The cabinet or council of ministers, while dependent on the legislative assembly, forms the unifying link between the two
powers and creates thereby the unity of political power. In fact, parliamentarism is the opposite of the separation of powers in that it aims successfully at converting the functional dualism into state monism by establishing a clear preponderance of the cabinet or executive over the parliament or legislative. Where development and rationalization of party
life has led to the parliamentary system, as in England-a priceless gift of
the Anglo-Saxon political genius to organized society-the doctrine of the
separation of powers was necessarily jettisoned, and fusion of executive
and legislative, or at least mutual interdependence of parliament and
government ensued. Such an evolution did not prevent, however, the
dogma of separation obstinately being held sacrosanct i" although, by a
subtle transformation of its content, it served no longer for the functional
purposes of governmental technique, but for the teleological aims of the
rule of law ("Rechtsstaat").
A peculiar version of the balance between legislative and executive

1oOn the French constitution of 1791 see L. Duguit, op. cit. supra note 5; Loewenstein,
op. cit. supranote 5,passim. In reality, the constitution of the Constituante was built, in spite
of the royal veto, on the inherent assumption of the supremacy of the legislative; see Redslob,
Die Verfassungstheorie der franz6sischen Nationalsammlung von 1789 (i912). Aulard, Histoire politique de la frangaise 553 ff. (1926); Esmein-N6zard, op. cit. supranote i, at p. 471 ff.
iz See Finer, op. cit. supranote 5,at 167 ff. The efforts of the classical school of French constitutional theorists to square the circle between the dogma of the separation of powers and the
conflicting reality of the parliamentary system are the core of the famous controversy between
Esmein, op. cit. supra note x, at 5o5 ff. on the one hand (followed by Duguit) and Carr6 de
Malberg op. cit. supranote 5, at 74 ff.
on the other who is bold enough to declare the maintenance of Montesquieu's doctrine mere sophistry. See also Eisenmann, op. cit., supra note 5
(who contends that Montesquieu did not separate government and parliament strictly speaking, but assigned to each power only juridical, not political independence). Similar laborious
efforts are made even in England; see, e.g., Wade and Phillips, Constitutional Law, 38 ff.
(1931). On the solution to be found in distinguishing between "power" and "function" see
Arthur, "S6paration des pouvoirs" et "s6paration des fonctions," Revue du droit public 217 ff.
(igoo). This theory, which permits the maintenance of the dogma while deviating from the
premises in practice, has been extremely helpful for reconciling delegation of functions with
nominal separation of powers.
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power grew out of the evolution of constitutional monarchy of the Central European type, e.g., in France between 1815 and 1848, in Germany
before and after 187o, and in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 2 Here the
Crown, in exercising the royal prerogative, was able to counterbalance
the parliament as the representation of the popular will by the device of
the discretionary appointment of the ministers who were responsible to
the Crown and not to the parliament. In these countries existed what may
be called, with due reservations, the successful establishment of an equilibrium between the executive and the legislative powers because, for the
sake of avoiding a deadlock, pregnant with revolution, some sort of compromise always had to be found. Bismarck's reaction against the Prussian
diet in the early sixties, however, shows that this precarious balance when
seriously disturbed, resulted invariably in the unchallengeable ascendancy
of the executive.13
Where political dynamics developed a parliamentary monarchy as in
England toward the end of the eighteenth century and, more decidedly,
after 1832, or in Belgium after 183I, 14 or in France under the July monarchy,' the Crown was more or less reduced to the function of stabilizer
or moderator of party politics;,6 by necessity the center of gravity shifted
12 On

the constitutional monarchy see Jellinek, Algemeine Staatslehre 696 ff. (3d ed.
Friedrich, op. cit. supra note x, at i5o ff. On the German Imperial constitution of
x871 see Mattem, Principles of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the German National
Republic, 55 ff. (1928); Meyer and Anschtitz, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrecht 270 ff.,
329 ff. ( 7 th ed., 19x8); Kaufmann, Zur Lehre des monarchischen Princips (iro6); Rehm, Das
politische Wesen der deutschen Monarchie, in: Festgabe fUr Otto Mayer, 59 ff. (i9i6). The
classical treatise on the subject is by Constant, Cours de politique constitutionnelle (186)
(one of many editions).
1922);

'3 Seen retrospectively, the failure of the Prussian diet in the famous conflict with Bismarck
over the army appropriations was perhaps the decisive event in modem German history; if the
parliament had succeeded in asserting itself against the executive, Germany would have
reached the parliamentary system and the history of Europe and the world might have taken a
different turn. Compare i Bismarck, Gedenken und Erinnerungen, 316 ff., 326 ff. (i915);
Weber, Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland, in: Gesammelte politische
Schriften 23o ff. (1921).

'4 On Belgium see Redslob, Le regime parlementaire ioo ff. (1924); Pirenne, Histoire de la
Belgique (1932); Mirkine-Guetz6vitch, i83o dans l'6vofution constitutionnelle de l'Europe,
Revue de l'histoire moderne 241 ff. (1931); E.F., io68.Io-I2 (Pirenne).
"5See Barthelemy-Duez, op. cit. supra note i, at 175 ff.; J. Barth61emy, L'Introduction
du r6gime parlementaire en France sous Louis XVIII et Charles X (1933).
,6 The theoretical foundation of the idea is due to Constant, op. cit. supra note 12. On the
position of the Crown in England see Ogg, English Government and Politics, at 82 ff. (1930).
Z. Marriott, The Mechanism of the Modern State 25 ff. (2927); Wade and Phillips, op. cit.
supranote i i, at 6i ff., 149 ff. On the position of monarchy today see Loewenstein, Monarchy
Gains Lost Ground in Europe, ir Soc. Science 202 (1936).
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to the parliament and the cabinet. The real issues of politics had to be
decided first between parliament and cabinet, later on between the people
and the government when the electorate at the polls became the final
7
arbiter.
From the position of the Crown in the parliamentary monarchy the
president as the head of the state in republican democracies derived his
rather restricted functions as evidenced by France after 1875. 8 On the
other hand, the traditional influence of the Crown in the constitutional
monarchy made itself felt in the efforts to assign wider and more independent powers to the head of the state under the Weimar republic, 9
an experiment which was bound to fail because presidential government,
even in its limited sense, is, in the last analysis, incompatible with parliamentary cabinet government.

20

17From among the myriads of books on the parliamentary system may be quoted here:
Redslob, Die parlamentarische Regierung (i918) (French edition of 1924 cited note 14 supra;
Hashach, Die parlamentarische Kabinettsregierung (igig); Barth6lemy, La crise de la d6mocratie contemporaine (1931); Barth~lemy-Duez, op. cit. supra note 1, 158 ff.; Esmein-N~zard,
op. cit. supra note x, vol. I, 154 ff.; 4 Duguit, Trait6 du droit constitutionnel io5 ff. (1924),
Finer, op. cit. supra, note 5, vol. II, 949 ff. on "monism" and "dualism" in the interpretation of the parliamentary system see Gouet, De l'unit6 du cabinet parlementaire 8 ff. (293o);
Friedrich, op. cit. supra note i, at 342 ff., 361 ff.; M6lot, L'6volution du regime parlementaire (1936) (containing contributions from various authors on the different countries under
parliamentary government); Burdeau, Le regime parlementaire dans les constitutions d'apr~sguerre Europ~ennes (1932); Mirkine-Guetz~vitch, Les nouvelles tendances du droit constitutionnel (2d ed. 1936); Capitant, R6gimes parlementaires, in: M61anges Carr6 de Malberg, 31 ff. (1933); Mirkine-Guetz6vitch, Le r~gime parlementaire dans les constitutions
europ~ennes d'apr~s guerre, in: Annuaire de l'Institut international du droit public 1936, 3 9 ff.
(1937); E.F. io68.i (Barth~lemy, Histoire du regime parlementaire); io68.2-4 (Barth6lemy,
France); iO68.5-14 (other countries by various authors).
IS On the position of the president in republican states see Barth6lemy-Duez, op. cit. supra
note i, at 45 ff., 6o6 ff.; Finer, op. cit. supranote 5, at iiio ff.; Samelli, I1 capo dello stato nelle
costituzione delle republiche del dopoguerra (2935); compare also the literature quoted supra
note i.

E.F. Io68.3 (Barth~lemy); io64.I (Gordon).
'9 On the position of the president under the Weimar republic see Anschiitz, Die Verfassung
des deutschen Reichs, 241 ff. ( 4 th ed. 1933); Finer, op. cit. supra note 5, Vol. II, 1o96 ff.; Heneman, The Growth of Executive Power in Germany (1934); Kraus, The Crisis of German
Democracy (1932).
20 This important aspect which explains at least partly the failure of constitutional government in Germany needs more clarification than it can be given here; compare the remarks of
Friedrich, op. cit., sapra note x, at 351; see also Herrfahrdt, Die Kabinettsbildung nach der
Weimarer Verfassung unter dem Einfluss der politischen Praxis (1927). For an excellent study
of the relations between president, cabinet and Reichstag see Renchin, Le chef de l'6tat et la
constitution du cabinet au droit public allemand (2937), particularly iog ff.; Wolgast, Zum
deutschen Parlamentarismus (1929). The political tension between president and cabinet
resulted ultimately in the establishment of the so-called "cabinet of combat"--Kampfrgicrvng"--a perversion of parliamentary government unprecedented in modern government short
of dictatorship.
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Thus we note that-with the exception of the United States-the doctrine of the balance, through separation, between executive and legislative powers nowhere could be converted into a lasting success. The dogmatic postulate had become a myth, and, at that, one of the most influential of all times in constitutional theory.
MAINTENANCE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE FIELD
OF THE JUDICIARY FUNCTION

For all intents and purposes, however, it became axiomatic for consti-

tutional government that, in the threefold division of powers, the judiciary was functionally divorced from the other two, even where appointment by the executive seemed indispensable.21 Both technically and psychologically the device for achieving independence was life tenure of magistrates, another gift of the Anglo-Saxon political genius to the modem
state. Here again the United States maintains a distinct position. Not
only was the judiciary function kept independent from the other powers,
but it became integrated into the system of checks and balances through

judicial review of legislative acts, whether they are sponsored by the administration or emanate from the initiative of Congress. This additional
check, although not explicitly envisaged by the framers of the constitution- and subsequently assailed as an unjustified interference of the courts

with the conduct of government, seems, in the light of Montesquieu's doctrine, only logical in establishing an "all-round" system of checks and
balances. It is noteworthy, however, and by no means accidental that
judicial review could implant itself permanently only in the country
where the separation of powers was institutionalized while imitations else21See, e.g., for England Wade and Phillips, op. cit. supranote ii, at 38 ff. Under the constitutional monarchy of the Central European pattern, magistrates though appointed by the
government were irremovable except by due process (through regular disciplinary courts), and

therefore the independence of the judiciary was as much guaranteed as in England and considerably more so than under the elective system in this country.
- See Hamilton in the Federalist Nos. 78-82; Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch (U.S.) 137
(z8o3). In view of the conflicting evidence presented in the National Convention the author is
inclined to assume that judicial review, at least for federal statutes, was not envisaged de lege
ferenda although the idea as such was by no means alien to American constitutional lawyers of
the period. See Hamilton and Adair, The Power to Govern, 143 and notes 97, 98 (1937): "It

is clear enough that the Convention meant to adopt 'judicial review,' but it does not follow
that their judicial review is the judicial review of today." Perhaps a clearer insight into the
stalus controversiae may be gained by referring to the very analogous situation under the
Weimar constitution of igig where judicial review although considered was left undecided.
When judicial review was adopted later on in practice (to a very limited extent), the justification was evolved by constitutional theory on similar premises as in this country, namely by
the idea of the supremacy of the constitution inherent in the written document.
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where failed to gain a lasting foothold,23 even where conditions were as
auspicious as, for example, in Switzerland.24 In no country operated on
the basis of a genuine parliamentary system was judicial review workable
as shown by republican Germany s or by Czechoslovakia where at present
6
it has completely disappeared.2
While independence of the judiciary became the very rockbed and
touchstone of constitutional government, dictatorships were driven perforce to destroy also this last element of the separation of powers. In
totalitarian Italy, Germany, and also, to a lesser extent, in some of the
authoritarian states, judicial independence has been superseded by political coordination accomplished usually by purges of the bench and by a
selective process of appointment on the basis of political conformity to
party tenets or the totalitarian demands of the regime.27
23 For abundant literature on judicial review in the various countries see E.F. 2o B-24;
io62.16 (Puget); 1o63.3-7 (Lambert). Further: Haines, American Doctrine of judicial Supremacy, Appendix 11573 ff. (2d ed. 1932), Haines, Some Phases of the Theory and Practice of
judicial review of Legislation in Foreign Countries, 24 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 583 (1924).
See also Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution, 5i ff. (1912); Haines, op. cit.
supra, at 126 ff.
For France see Barthclemy and Duez, op. cit. supra note i, at 203 ff.; Esmein and Nzard,
op. cit. supra note z, at 538 ff.; Blondel, Le contr6le jurisdictionnel de la constitutionnalit6 des

lois (X927).

For Germany see Anschiitz, op. cit. supranote i9, at 370ff.; 2 Anschiitz-Thoma, Handbuch
des deutschen Staatsrechts 546 ff.; Mattern, op. cit. supra note 12, at 590 ff.; Friedrich, 43
Pol. Sci. Q. 188 ff. (1928); Friederich, op. cit. supranote x, at 167 ff.
For Austria see Eisenmann, La justice constitutionnelle de la Haute Cour Constitutionnelle
de l'Autriche (1928).
For Czechoslovakia see Flanderka, Le contr6le de la constitutionnalit6 des lois en Tschechoslovaquie (1926).
24 On judicial review in Switzerland see Fleiner, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 441 ff.
(1923); Rappard, Le contr6le de la constitutionnalit6 des lois f~drales par le juge aux Etats
Unis et en Suisse (i934). Judicial review of federal courts exists in Switzerland only for cantonal legislation; see Rappard, The Government of Switzerland 5o, 90 (i937). A popular
initiative for extending judicial review to federal statutes, introduced in 1935, is as yet undecided.
2S See for Germany: Weimar constitution, article i9; Anschiitz, op. cit. supra note 19, at
i59 ff.; for Canada see Heneman, Dominion Disallowance of Provincial Legislation in Canada,
31 Pol. Sci. Rev. 92 ff. (1937).; 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 618 ff. (i937); E.F. io64.6 (Lambert).
26 Sander, Das tschechoslovakische Verfassungsrecht in der Jahren 1929-1935, in: 23 Jahrbuch des iffentlichen Recht, 263 (1936).
'7 No details can be given here. Note, however, that the problem of civil justice in dictatorial countries has thus far been little investigated. For Germany compare Loewenstein, Law
in the Third Reich, 45 Yale L. J. 779, 805 (1936), and ibid., notes 94 to 96; Loewenstein, Dictatorship and the German Constitution, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 565 (1937); Cot, La conception
hitlerienne du droit (1938). For Italy see Steiner, The Fascist Conception of Law, 36 Col. L.
Rev. 1267 ff. (1936).
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THE TECHNICAL ASPECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS

Furthermore, from the viewpoint of governmental technique proper,
cogent reasons no longer can be found for a rigid distribution of executive
and legislative functions of the state among different agencies. Obviously
practical considerations necessitate a division of labor since no single individual or no single body of individuals is able to cope simultaneously
with the manifold activities of modern state administration. Basically,
however, it is not intelligible why the agency which deliberates and sanctions the law should not also take care of its execution, that is the application of the general rule to the individual situation. It was no less an authority than Rousseau obsessed by his idea of the general will as the ultimate source of political action, who contended that legislation could provide for all contingencies and that, therefore, execution of the legislative
will should be merely a subordinate function.28 In the meantime, however,
the relation between the two functions has been reversed. Administrative
action has become more important than legislative sanction. All state
activities tend to be mere instrumentalities of political leadership. The
main function of the government is no longer that of executing the law
as the general will, but, on the contrary, that of guiding the general will
and of exercising leadership, qualities for which legislative or administrative functions are only means toward an end. Legislation has become a
function of political leadership. As a rule, also in democracies the government has the initiative of and responsibility for and, for example in England, the virtual monopoly of legislative action. The legislative assemblies as such may criticize and even reject the government's proposals,
but, as a rule, they are confined to being principle confirming agencies
without ambition or potentiality of political leadership. Thus, the application of the statute to the individual situation is more or less an incident
of legislative power, or, legislation is merely instrumental to the fulfillment
of the objectives of general policy prescribed or dictated by the government. Paradoxically one may even contend that the agency which enacts
the law is best suited for carrying it out. By their very nature executive
and legislative actions are only different stages of the same political process and the same political will. On the other hand, technically as well as
morally the postulate remains unaffected that the judicial function should
be wholly divorced from both the other functions since deciding of issues
and controversies on the basis of the law requires evidently a different
technique. Mpreover, the judicial function guarantees justice against the
Du Contrat social, book III, ch. i.
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holder of every other power and function, namely, the state. But even
if Montesquieu, in the environment of the primarily administrative state
under absolutism, was justified in vindicating separate spheres of action
for both the making and executing of the law, his basic assertion is materially disproved by the experience in all modern states where the government increasingly assumes responsibility and initiative of the legislative
function which the legislative bodies are politically unable or technically
unfit to perform, as shown by the vast volume of delegated legislation or
even executive legislation, without explicit delegation, on the basis of
original or usurped ordinance making powers of the government 2 9 The
borderline between legislation and administration, once a fundamental
maxim of the constitutional state, has become more and more vague. It
can scarcely be denied, that, from the viewpoint of technical achievement
and perfection, the combination of legislative and executive or administrative objectives serves the purposes of efficiency in modem administration better than the splitting up of an essentially uniform process into
two separate departments. This conclusion may appear as heresy to the
orthodox constitutional lawyer, but nonetheless it corresponds to the realities of modern state empiricism.
THE REAL IMPLICATION OF MONTESQUIEU'S DOCTRINE: SEPARATION OF

POWERS GUARANTEES POLITICAL LIBERTY
Such critical observations, drawn from the actual political situation, do
not in the least affect the lasting and, in fact, immortal core of the doctrine of the great French political realist. Stripped of its merely technical
implications, which, as it has been indicated, are no longer convincing or
even correct, the ethical content remains unimpaired. In its original conception and purpose it was the masterly political device which dismantled
royal absolutism for the ultimate sake of political liberalism although this
result may have been beyond Montesquieu's pragmatic intentions. Theory and practice of contemporary dictatorial government, which is so
much akin to the absolutism of the eighteenth century, amply justify an
emphatic restatement of the irrefutable arguments in favor of liberty
from arbitrary oppression which appears today no less in the guise of the
29 This is, of course, one of the topics in which modern constitutional law is most interested.
See p. 598 infra,on the pleins pouvoirs and delegated legislation. For England see Lord Hewart
of Bury, The New Despotism (1929); Willis, The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments (1935); Robson, justice and Administrative Law (1928); Allen, Law in the
Making 304 ff. (2d ed., 1930). Report on Ministers Powers, Cmd. 4o6o-1932; Loewenstein,
Verfassungsleben in Grossbritannien 1924-1932, 2o Jahrbuch des 6ffentlichen Rethts 297 ff.
(1932); Jacoby, Delegation of Powers and Judicial Review, 36 Col. L. Rev. 871 ff., 882 ff.
(1936).
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raisond' tat than it did under Charles the First or Louis the Fourteenth.
Separation of powers is bound up with political liberty. It disappears
where liberty has vanished.30 The foremost objective of any government
which deserves this noble name is that of preserving and guaranteeing
political liberty. Says Montesquieu: "La libert6 politique dans un
citoyen est cette tranquillit6 d'6sprit qui provient de l'opinion que chacun
a de sa sur6t6; et pour qu'on ait cette libert6, il faut que le gouvernement
soil tel qu'un citoyen ne puisse pas craindre un autre citoyen." 3 In terms
of modem interpretation political liberty signifies and embodies the rule of
law. 32 Psychological and historical experience prove to the hilt the truth of
Montesquieu's maxim that any human being endowed with power abuses
his power to the detriment of those subjected to his domination. 33 The
famous passage should be quoted in full: "C'est une experience 6ternele
que tout homme qui a du pouvoir est port6 en abuser. fl va jusquI ce qu'il
trouve des limites. Pour qu'on ne puisse abuser du pouvoir il faut que par la
disposition des choses le pouvoir arr~te le pouvoir.' ' 34The technical presupposition of the doctrine of the separation of powers may be historically unfounded and empirically disproved; its ethical implications, namely, the
ultimate purpose of protecting political liberty against the encroachments
of unlimited power, has been conducive, in the last analysis, for supplementing the postulate of the division of powers among different human
agencies by the demand of mutual checks and balances among them for
controlling power. Only controlled power is justified power. Perhaps at
30 See, e.g., Barthilemy, Precis du droit public 280 ff. (1937); E.F. 1o63.7 (H. Puget);
1030.7 (R. Carr6 de Malberg). The opposite view prevails of course in dictatorial constitu-

tional law; see, e.g., Koehler, Grundlehren des deutschen Verwaltungsrechts (935). Koellreutter, Grundriss der algemeinen Staatslehre 87 ff. (1933). In Soviet-Russia and in Turkey
the principle of the separation of powers has been explicitly abandoned (prior to the constitution).
31 Esprit des lois, book XI, ch. 6.
3" See the classic definition by Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Constitution, i79
ff. (8th ed. 1915). See, however, for incisive strictures of Dicey's theory Jennings, Law and the
Constitution (i933). For definition of the "Rechsslaa" see Jellinek, op. cit. supra note 12, at
246 ff.; McIlwain, Government by Law, 14 Foreign Affairs 185 ff. (1936). On the disappearance of the rule of law under National Socialism see Loewenstein, Law in the Third Reich,
45 Yale L. J., 779, 802 ff. (1936).
33 For an illuminating case history of the maxim that power corrupts power see Loewenstein,
The Dictatorship of Napoleon the First, 35 So. Atl. Q: 298 ff. (1936); Loewenstein, Opposition
and Public Opinion under the Dictatorship of Napoleon the First, 4 Soc. Research 461 ff.
(1937); Loewenstein, Die Diktatur Napoleons des Ersten, i4 Zeitschrift fUr ifentliches Recht
457 ff. (1936).
34 This passage is found in chapter 4 of book XI, thus preceding the famous discussion of the
British constitution in chapter 6.
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no time in modern history have the psychological ingredients of Montesquieu's doctrine been more imperative.
II. HISTORICAL RETROSPECT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER
CLAXIFICATION OF THE TERM "EXECUTIVE"

Next in this dogmatic approach to the thesis of the balance between
executive and legislative power it is necessary to determine more precisely
what is meant by the term "executive" as opposed to the term "legislative." When using the term executive we mean, for the sake of brevity,
not-the titular head of the state but the government as a political agency
which assumes responsibility in the legal sense before the country and in
the transcendental sense before history. Even in totalitarian dictatorships, as in Italy and in Greece, or in camouflaged dictatorships, as in
Austria and Portugal, a titular head, whether under the name of king or
of president of the state, may survive as figurehead, although deprived of
actual powers. In democratic republics and monarchies of the parliamentary type, too, the president of the state or the personal occupant of
the throne has surrendered his powers, more or less completely, to the
cabinet or the government. It should be remembered here, however, that
in parliamentary monarchies such as belgium, the Netherlands or in the
Scandinavian countries 3s which are equally subject to the vicissitudes of
party life, the holder of the royal office recently has acquired more momentun within the dynamics of the state than could be expected when
the historical mission of parliamentarism, namely the neutralization of
the royal prerogative, has been accomplished. 36 Only under presidential
government proper is the president as the head of the executive identical
with the holder of real power, as in the United States where the "cabinet"
or the heads of the departments are his personal trustees who are not
amenable to responsibility before Congress.37 Similarly in Germany of
the Weimar constitution, the president gained power far beyond the
original terms of his office because of the calamitous delusion contained
in the constitutional scheme to the effect that the Reichs-Chancellor's
position could be made contingent both on the confidence of the p6pu35S
On Sweden see Tingst~n, L'6volution du parlementarisme Su&lois, in: Annales de l'Institut
du droit compar6 3 if. (1934); Braunias, Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht 475 if. (1932); Redslob, Le regime parlementaire 136 ff. (1924).
36On recent developments see Loewenstein, Monarchy Gains Lost Ground in Europe, ii
Soc. Sci. 202 ff. (1936).
37 On the Amercan "cabinet" system see Finer, op. cit. supra note 5,at zo44 ff.; Friedrich,
op. cit. supra note i,at 35; Learned, The President's Cabinet (1912).
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larly elected president and the popularly elected Reichstag. This fundamental misconstruction played automatically into the hands of the president when political extremism had succeeded in narrowing the parliamentary basis of the coalition cabinets. The situation could not but
lead into legal no-man's land 38 and ultimately to dictatorship when
von Hindenburg, after the dismissal of Dr. Briining in 1933, tried to
substitute presidential government outright for parliamentary support
of the cabinet. In democratic states, position and actual powers of the
president evidently depend largely on the method of appointment,
whether by the people or by the parliamentary bodies, as witnessed by
France, Czechoslovakia and Austria. The position of the president is
stronger when he is not elected by the parliament.39 The Swiss Bundesrat
is an exception which confirms the rule.40 Yet actual power depends
very much on the personality of the president irrespective of the mode
of appointment, as shown by Massaryk and Beneg in Czechoslovakia 4l
where the National Assembly elects the president, and by Svinhuvfund in Finland 42 where special electors elected by the people, together
with the deputies, form the electoral college.
It will be shown later that recent constitutional developments in various states indicate a change in attitude toward office and function of the
state president.43 Estonia, for example, which in her first post-war constitution had no presidency at all, by the reform of 1934 established the
office of the popularly elected president who totally eclipsed the government proper. 44 A similar development appears in the new Irish constitution of 1937 with largely increased powers of a popularly elected state
38 The problem was not dearly realized until it was too late. See AnschUtz, op. cit. supra
note 1g, at 32, 318 ff. (with literature); Anschiitz-Thoma, op. cit. supra note 23, at 487 ff.;
Heneman, op. cit. supra note ig, at ri9 ff.; Renchin, op. cit. supranote 20, passim.

39 Finland (constitution of i919) and Spain (constitution of 1931) have a combination of
parliamentary and popular election by adding to the members of parliament specially elected

electors, both together forming the electoral college.
40

On the legal and political position of the Swiss Bundesrat see Fleiner, op. cit. supra note

24, at 182 ff.; Rappard, op. cit. supra (Government of Switzerland) note 24, at 7 6 ff.; E F. io68
x4-16 (d'Ernst).
For additional references see note 107 infra.
41On

the president in Csechoslovakia see Sander, op. cit. supra note 26, at 278 ff.
4On the president and constitutional developments in Finland see Erich, Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Finland bis Ende 1931, 2oJahrbuch des iffentlichen Rechts 323 (1932); Graham, Finland, in Buell, New Governments in Europe (1934), pp. 26z ff.; Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, 31 Pol. Sci. Rev. 638 (i937).
43 For details see p. 588 infra.
44 See p. 588 infra.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

president. 4- On the other hand, ample experience since the war has demonstrated beyond doubt that the popular election of the president, intended as a counter-weight to the instability of parliamentary party government, gravely endangers the functioning of the parliamentary system
as evidenced in republican Germany and Spain. The plebiscitary character of his office, when based on popular election, may easily open the
way to an authoritarian or dictatorial regime.
THE FOUR PERIODS

Seen retrospectively, the historical development of constitutional government insofar as the relation between the legislative and the executive
is concerned, seems clearly divided into four periods.
Ascendancy of the parliament.-When royal absolutism succumbed to
rising liberalism, as in England after 1688, in France after 1789, the natural recipient of liberal aspirations was the parliament. Rousseau's seductive doctrine of the omnipotency of the legislative as well as the pent-up
resentment against absolutism were responsible for the fact that the democratic ideology behind modern constitutionalism claimed the ultimate
power of political decision for the representatives, since they alone were
believed dogmatically to reflect what has been called the will of the people. 4' During the nineteenth century, the attempt to democratize the
representative institutions has obscured, to a large extent, the real issues
of political leadership as involved in the distribution and location of political power. By transfer of psychological emphasis the parliament as center
of political gravity acquired rights and powers of full sovereignty which
the monarchy and the classes affiliated with the Crown were forced to surrender. The long-drawn process took a different tempo in different countries as evidenced by France where progression and retrogression alternated almost cyclically, while in the so-called constitutional monarchies
of the Central European type the final ascendancy of parliament was
4s Articles 12 to I4 of the constitution of 1937. On the Irish presidency see Keith, ig Jour.
of Comp. Leg. 268 ('937). There is a good deal of disagreement about the possibilities of a
strong presidency in Eire according to the new constitution. See Bromage, Constitutional
developments in the Saorstat Eireann and the Constitution of Eire, ii Internal affairs, 31
Pol. Sci. Rev. io5o, 1o58 (1)37). The election of Mr. Hyde to the presidency in April, z938,
seems to indicate that at least Mr. DeValera considers the functions of the president as merely
formal. But the constitutional document may lend itself in time to a more literal interpretation, even against Mr. DeValera.

46On the supremacy of the legislature (amounting to the dictatorship of an assembly) during the French Revolution see Mirkine-Guetz6vitch, Le gouvernement parlementaire sous la
Convention, in Cahiers de la Revolution Frangaise 47 if. (1937); Mirkine-Guetz~vitch,
Parlementarisme sous la Convention Nationale, Revue du Droit Public 671 ff. (1935).
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delayed until after the war. Thus an irresistible political evolution,
which had begun with the French revolution bore in many countries its
final fruits as late as in the post-war constitutions. 47 A particular position
was held only by England where, following the curbing of the powers of
the Crown by aristocratic and plutocratic forces, the period of parliamentary sovereignty lasted not longer than a generation (between 1832 and
1867).48 But in spite of variations, the evolution of constitutional government from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the post-war constitutions reveals a uniform trend toward the predominance of the legislative
as the legal exponent of the popular will over the government whose main
function was that of executing the will of the people. While a graphic
representation of the battle front between executive and legislative during
the nineteenth century would reveal considerable sinuosity according to
national conditions, it is safe to say that nowhere a technical formula was
found which guaranteed a lasting balance between executive and legislative powers. Periods of temporary stabilization of the political equilibrium in favor of the executive were followed invariably by a new drive of
the democratic impulses in the guise of parliamentary processes. The ultimate victory of the legislative was concomitant with the final establishment of parliamentary ascendancy.
Resurgence of executive power as emergency device during the war.-The
incisive surgical operation administered to the body politic of Europe by
the world war, forced the issue into the open. For technical reasons, the
emergency situation during the war caused a sudden resurgence, in every
country, of almost unrestricted though not entirely uncontrolled powers
of the executive for the sake of the conduct of the war 49 or for the maintenance of neutrality50 Under the pressure of the "union sacr6e" the legislative, in states at war, abdicated more or less voluntarily in favor of the
government bent upon winning the war. Constitutional government was
everywhere suspended. What seemed, at first, only as a passing episode,
47 See Burdeau, op. cit. supra note 17, at 79 ff.; Mirkine-Guetz6vitch, Les nouvelles ten-

dances du droit constitutionnel I1 7 ff. (2d ed. 1936).
48 Loewenstein, Zur Soziologie der parlamentarischen Repr'isentation in England nach der
grossen Reform: Das Zeitalter der Parlamentssouverdnitiit

(832-1867),

51 Zeitschrift far

Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 6r3 (r924).
49 See for France, Renouvin, The Forms of War Government in France (1927); JZze,
L'excutif en temps de guerre (les pleins pouvoirs) (I917). For comparative material see
Onisor, Les dcrets-lois et le droit des circonstances au cours de la guerre mondiale (933).
For United States see Berdahl, War Powers of the Executive in the United States (1920).
so For example in Switzerland see Resolution of the Federal Council of August 3, 1914 (A. S.
347); Jacoby, op. cit. supra note

29,

at 896; Tingst6n, Les pleins pouvoirs, 58 ff. (1934);

Gouet, La question constitutionnelle des pr6tendus d~crets-lois x83 ff.

(1932).
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proved, in the light of contemporary events, in fact to be a sort of a dress
rehearsal for the final and definitive restoration of executive predominance
of our own time. On the pattern of war government, most types of present crisis governments have been modeled.
Post-war predominance of the parliament.-When the temple of Janus
was closed, of the belligerent nations England, France, and Belgium, and
most of the neutral states returned to the pre-war efforts of stabilizing the
equilibrium between parliament and government. The defeated nations,
however, and particularly the newly created states, in violent reaction
against the oppression of their former rulers-thus repeating the process
which occurred after the breakdown of absolutism in France-resorted to
a pattern of government in which technique and spirit of party-driven
parliamentary supremacy triumphed. Fulfillment of ultra-democratic
aspirations haunting post-war Europe could not but lead, for the time being, to unprecedented predominance of the legislative over the executive.
The post-war const'tutions of Reich and Lnder in Germany, Austria,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland and the Baltic states, and even of Yugoslavia were operated, for a short while, on the principle of unmitigated
parliamentary sovereignty.-I After one hundred and fifty years Rousseau
had defeated Montesquieu. Some of the recurring features which reflect,
in terms of constitutional arrangements, the rationalization of the supremacy of parliament, may be summarized here.2 Usually the government or cabinet was dependent upon or even nominated by the parliament. Pertinent illustrations are Austria, Prussia and Estonia. Political
parties although not formally recognized by the constitution, became the
actual source of political power.53 When efforts were made to ensure the
stability of the government, the solution was not found in creating a strong
majority party, but by mechanical devices such as the quorum for a vote
of non-confidence, as in Czechoslovakia S4 and in Spain.55 Proportional
representation, as the literal and possibly mathematical realization of the
"will of the people," undermined the formation of large blocs of public
opinions6 which alone make for the stability of governments. In addition,
sr G. Burdeau, op. cit. supra note 17, at 141 ff., 167 ff., 203 ff.
s2See Mirkine-Guetz6vitch, op. cit. supra note 47; E.F. 1o70.--3; Barth~lemy, La crise de
la d6mocratie comtemporaine (1931); Gordon, op. cit. supra note i.

S3Pelloux, Les parties politiques dans les constitutions d'aprgsguerre, Revue du droit
public 238 ff. (1934); Vesseyt, De la n6cessit6 des partis organis~s en regirne parlementaire
(1933).
.4 Constitution of 192o, articles 75 to 77.
ss Constitution of 1931, article 64.
s6 See Finer, op. cit. supra note $, at 914 ff.; E.F. io66.2 (M. Carrier); Friedrich, op. cit.

supra note x, at 269 ff. (with extensive literature on p. 544); Hermens, Demokratie und Wahl-
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sometimes a system of permanent parliamentary committees duplicated
the vices of the parliament in various respects, as in Czechoslovakia. s 7 In
general, the post-war constitutions are animated by deep distrust of the
executive whose powers were cut down in favor of a "pure" expression of
the will of the people erroneously believed to be reflected best in multiple
parties.
Recent recrudescenceof strong executive powers.-The reasons why parliamentary democracy of the post-war pattern broke down in almost all
countries where it was tried out, are too well known to be repeated here.58
They may be summarized by the statement that the rationalization of
political power as embodied in the paper of constitutional documents
failed to provide for the essential quality of all government, namely political leadership. It is a truism that political leadership cannot be produced
by constitutional arrangements, but it is equally true that it can be prevented from getting into stride by a clumsy structure of constitutional
law. Evidently parliamentary government is workable only where unanimity about the fundamentals of national values is unbroken. In the absence of such unanimity, the strain of how to harmonize conflicting conceptions on the therapeutics to be administered to the ailing body politic
resulted in most states in destruction of the policy-forming process
through parliament,59 and, in consequence thereof, in economic disintegration and even chaos. More and more the legislative body torn by internal dissensions, became incapable of expeditious action or any action at
all. Consequently, the pendulum swung back violently to the other extreme. Hence emerged what may be called leadership superimposed upon
the will of the people instead of leadership generated by the will of the people. In some states, the change in governmental technique was accomplished by stages of a more gradual evolution from parliamentarism to
monopolization of political power by the executive, as in Italy or in Austria; in other countries social pressure led to revolutionary overthrow of
the constitution by scantily veiled or open coup d'etat as in Poland, Gerrecht (1933); Hermens, Proportional Representation and the Breakdown of German Democracy, 3 Social Research 411 (1936); Humpbregs, 4 Social Research 225 (1937); 2 Braunias,
op. cit. supra note 35, at 191 ff., 221 ff.; Aris, Proportional Representation in Germany, 2
Politica 433 ff. (x937).
57 Czechoslovakian constitution of 192o, Art. 54; see E.F. 1070.1-3 (B. Mirkine-Guetzdvitch); Spanish constitution of 1933, Arts. 6i, 62, 8o.
58 The classic statement is by Barth~lemy, La crise de la d~mocratie contemporaine (931);
see also E.F. io8o.z (L. Febvre); io8o.2-3 (d'Ormesson).

59Loewenstein, Autocracy versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe, 29 Pol. Sci. Rev.
571 ff., 755 ff. (1935)-
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many or Greece. As the result, in most of the newly established democratic and parliamentary states, authoritarian or outright dictatorial governments came into life. But regardless of external forms, concentration
instead of separation of powers in the hands of the leader or the leading
group is characteristic for all of them. The executive whatever name it
bears has completely eclipsed the legislative in the totalitarian states of
Russia, Italy, Germany and Turkey, as it does in the group of authoritarian republics like Austria, Portugal, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania or
in the group of the authoritarian monarchies of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
Greece, and, to a lesser extent, also in Hungary and Rumania.
But even among the traditional democracies where liberal-democratic
spirit and institutions remained unimpaired, at least formally, in these
recent years since the beginning of the economic crisis, a tranformation
of the relationship between legislative and executive has travelled fast
and far. The crisis, irreverent to political dogma, struck at authoritarian
and democratic states alike. Legislative decisions of parliaments, lagging
behind events, were incapable of dealing with the crisis. Also in democracies a basic change in the traditional concepts of political technique is
clearly under way. In England, France, Czechoslovakia, in Belgium, Finland and the Irish Freestate, even in Switzerland, the executive, by a
constitutional process of ever increasing momentum has come to overplay
the legislative to such an extent that the classical doctrine of the preestablished harmony between the state powers has fallen in abeyance.
III. SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT RELATIONS BETWEEN
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS
Although it is rather hazardous to establish clear-cut types because of
the great variety of forms in the various states, an attempt will be made
to systematize the present patterns of relationship between executive and
legislative.
TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSIPS

The first category embraces those states in which a more or less complete fusion of powers has taken place to the benefit of either a single person, or a single group of persons or a single party. No example exists today of the constitutional dictatorship of an assembly for which in France
the Convention of 1792, the Senate in 1814, or the legislative assemblies
of 1848 and 1871 are the historical illustrations. °
6o For the dictatorship of an assembly compare the National Convention of 1792. See also
note 46 supra; i Deslandres, listoire constitutionnelle de la France de 1789 & x870 207 if.
(1932); also v. 2, 323 ff. (Legislative Assembly of 1848) and 726 fl. (Constituent Assembly
of 1871).
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The totalitarian dictatorships of Russia, Italy, Germany, Turkey 6' are
qualified by the fact that concentration of powers has been officially substituted for separation of powers. One man alone, or conjointly with a
group of popularly irresponsible advisors, wields the totality of powers
without any constitutional limitations whatever.62 The absolute ruler
represents the will of the state and monopolizes political power in all its
manifestations. The will of the people is institutionalized in the organization of the single or official party which the dictator as leader of the
party controls supremely. Stripped of its pseudo-constitutional trappings
which no dictatorship seems willing to forego, the totalitarian state is the
technological rationalization of absolutism or despotism familiar to students of history. Invariably, however, this unequivocal situation is obfuscated by the adroit use of legalistic indoctrination which preserves
nominally institutions and even terminology of democracy. Variations in
the arrangement of this auxiliary machinery of government indicate rather more different shades of politicalfinesse of the absolute rulers than substantial deviations from the standard pattern of full concentration of all
state functions in the person of the leader and his obsequious group. For
the complete merger of executive and legislative powers it makes little difference that, in Germany, the Reichstag is admittedly ornamental 63 while
to chamber and Senate in Italy has been left at least the formal right of
participation in the legislative process. 64 In both instances the legislative
bodies, in fact appointed by the dictators on the one party ticket, are subservient tools of the dictator and utterly incapable of expressing the will of
61The boundless mass of foreign literature on dictatorship is almost exclusively descriptive of all phases and aspects while scientific treatises of constitutional law, likewise abundant
within the borders of dictatorial countries, are more or less conspicuous by their absence in
foreign countries. Instead of giving specific quotations here the reader is referred to the elaborate bibliographical data contained in the E.F. For Italy see E.F. 1084.1-4 (L. Febvre);
1084.5-15 (H. Lagardelle). For Germany see E.F. io68.1-25 (H. Jourdan, H. Brunschwig).
For Russia see 1082.1-11 (G. Meguet). For Turkey see o9o.i-4 (E. Thomas).
6For Germany see Loewenstein, Dictatorship and the German Constitution, 4 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 537, 554 if. (1937); Ermath, The New Germany 48 ff. (1936); Bonnard, Le
droit et l'tat dans la doctrine national socialiste (1936); Stoffel, La dictature du fascisme
allemand (1936). The official German doctrine of the relation between executive and legislative power is presented by Hamel, Gleichgewicht zwischen gesetzgebender und vollziehender
Gewalt, in Deutsche Landesreferate zum ii. Internationalen Congress fur Rechtsvergleichurg im Haag 1937, 438 (1937). For Italy see Finer, Mussolini's Italy 248 (1935); Steiner,
Government in Fascist Italy (1938).
63 Loewenstein, op. cil. supra note 62, at 558 ff.
64

Finer, op. cit. supranote 62, at 255 ff.; Schneider, The Fascist Government of Italy 5z ff.

(1936); Rosenstock-Franck, L'conomie corporative fasciste en doctrine et en fact 242 ff.

(i934); Steiner op. cit. supranote 62, at 69.
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the people or of checking the arbitrariness of the supreme leader. Moreover, Italy presents in the government controlled Fascist Grand Council
a legalized institution of mixed legislative and executive or administrative
functions. s At any rate, the essential feature in dictatorships is the complete absence of any legitimate method of control of the leader by public
opinion from which the leading group is left exempt. In Russia, where the
new constitution of 1937 studiously pays lip service to the rational division of powers, there is no evidence that the ostentatious institutionalization of democratic instrumentalities in the constitution is more than the
tribute of traditional despotism to Western ideology for political purposes
at home and abroad.
AUTHORITARIAN STATES

Technically although perhaps not quite ideologically in close neighborhood to totalitarian dictatorships are the so-called authoritarian6 6 states of
the corporate pattern,67namely, Austria until its absorption, and Portugal.
In Austria we observe the customary turn from post-war predominance of
the parliament first to the strengthening of the executive (president and
government) by the constitutional reform of 192968 and finally, after the
self-incapacitation of the chamber in 1933, to the coup d'etat of Dollfuss,
legalized, as legality goes, by the pseudo-corporate constitution of 193469
which follows some clues offered by the Papal Encyclical Quadragesimo
Anno of 1931.70 A vastly complicated machinery of councils the members
6s On the fascist Grand Council see Finer, op. cit. supranote 62, at 276 ff.; Schneider, op. cit.
supra note 62, at 47 if.; Macedonio, I Gran Consiglio del Fascismo (1934).
6 On the very dogmatic differentiation between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" states
see Ziegler, Autoritdrer oder totaler Staat (1932).
67 For a critical attitude to corporativism in general see Speyer, Corporativisme ou parlementarisme r~form6 (1935); Pr6, Le bilan du corporativisme (1936); Bourgin, L'6tat corporatif
en Italie (1935); Mirkine-Guetz6vitch, Le nio-absolutisme corporatif, in Annie politique
frangaise et 6trangare 251 ff. (1934); Loewenstein, Occupational Representation and the
Idea of an Economic Council, 12 Social Sci. 426 ff. (1937); Finer, op. cit. supranote 62, at 492 ff.
A more positive endorsement of corporativism is given by Manoilescu, Le siicle des corporations (1936); Bonnard, Syndicalisme, corporatisme et l'6tat corporatif (1937).
68For a genuinely scientific discussion of Austrian constitutional law since the war see
Voegelin, Der autoritre Staat (1936). See also Burdeau, op. cit. supra note 17, at 148 ff.;
E.F. I088.-2 (L. Febvre).
69On the Austrian constitution of 1934 see Merkel, Die stiindisch-autoritUre Verfassung
Oesterreichs (1935); E. Voegelin, op. cit. supra note 68, at iSo ff. (extensive bibliography on
286 ff.); Nawiasky, Staatstypen der Gegenwart 175 ff. (i935); Raschhofer, Oesterreichs neue
Verfassung, i4 Zeitschrift ftir auslindisches Wfentliches Recht 846 ff. (I934).
E.F. io88.4-5 (L. Febvre).
70 On the Encyclical "QuadragesitnoAnno" see Kerschagl, Die Quadragesimo Anno und der

neue Staat (1935); Nawiasky, op. cit. supra note 69, at 166 ff.
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of which were, without exception, directly or indirectly appointed by the
government, is the corporate setting for factual government dictatorship.
A similar version of Catholic authoritarian concepts has been introduced
in Portugal by the constitution of 1933.7' The government, acting nominally under a popularly "elected" president, cannot be overthrown by the
corporate chamber from which all real powers have been carefully transferred to the government.
AUTHORITARIAN STATES WITH NOMINAL PRESERVATION OF
PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS

A slightly different pattern of governmental ascendancy over the legislative is offered by such states where parliamentary institutions are nominally still in existence and the multiple party system has not yet been
wholly superseded by the government controlled single party mechanism.
We may qualify this type of authoritarian government as neo-presidential because, in addition to the government, the person of the president
plays an important role in shaping internal policies. The head of the state
has risen above the position of a merely ceremonial figure or, at its best, of
a stabilizer of temporary fluctuations. Supported by the army, he prevails on the government no less than the monarchical ruler of a by-gone
age, and through the government he controls public opinion and the parliamentary machinery. For the sake of illustration we may refer to Poland.7 2 Here the transformation of an impotent parliamentarism into
camouflaged dictatorship of the executive was accomplished in two stages
of constitutional reform (in 1926 and 1935) whereby the methods of open
coup d'gtat as well as of constitutionally disguised coercion were successfully applied. The undisputed ascendancy of the state president and his
cabinet was finally accomplished by ingenious manipulations of constitutional processes. Party cadres and parliamentary bodies, moving in narrow channels prescribed by government control, are no longer efficient in1 On the Portuguese dictatorship which is generally considered both as benevolent and

beneficial, see Speyer, op. cit. supra note 67, at 65 ff. and passim; Pr6, op. cit. supra note 67,
at 1o3 ff.; Descamps, Le Portugal, La vie sociale actuelle (i935); Pereira dos Santos, Un 6tat
corporatif, le Portugal (1935); Anderssen, Die portugiesische Diktatur, 26 Archiv des 6ffentlichen Rechts ioi (x934); Cota, Economic Planning in Corporative Portugal (1938); Lamson,
Le corporativisme en Portugal (1938).
72On the present constitutional situation in Poland see Deryng, Le probl~me de l'6quilibre
entre le pouvoir 1dgislatif et le pouvoir excutif et la nouvelle constitution Polonaise, in La
Th~mis Polonaise, s6rie III, vol. io, 89 ff.; Delmas, L'6volution constitutionnelle de la Pologne depuis i919 (x936); Cybichowsky, Der Entwurf der neuen polnischen Verfassung,
25 Archiv des 6ffentlichen Rechts 316 (1934); Cybichowsky, Die Entwicldung des polnischen Staatsrechts in den Jahren 1921-1934, 22 Jahbuch des 6ffentlichen Rechts 527 ff.
(i935); E.F. 1074.4 (Wirkine-Guetz6vitch); io88.I2, 13 (Jouve).
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struments for the exercise of independent legislative powers. Both selection of parliamentary personnel and, in addition, rigid control of its activities guarantee complete conformity to the instructions of the government.
At the present moment, however, the political situation shows rather divergent trends. Under Pilsudski's successor efforts are noticeable to convert the multiple party system into the convenient single party pattern
of the totalitarian state, destined, perhaps, to anticipate the revival of a
real opposition which seems to indicate that the nation is tired of the tutelage of the military clique. The final outcome of this tug-of-war is, for the
time being, still in suspense. On the whole, the climate in Central and
Eastern Europe is more favorable to the one-party regime than to a relaxation of the strong grip the government holds on the country.
By similar development, presidential government was substituted for
the genuine parliamentary pattern in the Baltic states. In Estonia73 the
constitutional reform of 1934 established presidential government. Although the new constitution permitted parliament to continue and even
to withdraw its confidence from the acting government, the president, by
the right of dissolution and by controlling the government, is the actual
center of political power. It should be noted, however, that, by referendum in 1936, the people decided for the restoration of parliamentary government, and a new constitution on more genuinely democratic and parliamentary lines, is now in force. Thus Estonia exemplifies the transitional character of the presidential regime ready to disappear when
economic and political appeasement for which it was installed, have sufficiently progressed. On the other hand, Latvia and Lithuania74 are at
73 On presidential government in Estonia see A. de Chanbon, La r~publique d'Estonie
(1936); Loewenstein, op. cit. supranote 42, at 639 ff.; Roucek, Constitutional changes in Estonia, 30 P0l. Sci. Rev. 556 ff. (i936); St. v. Csekey, Die Verfassungsentwicklung Estlands
1929-1934, 22 Jahrbuch des Wfentlichen Rechts 41r ff. (I935); Tatarin-Tarnheyden, Autocratische Regierungen in Lettland und Esthland und deren vlkische Politik, 26 Archly des
6ffentlichen Rechts 257 ff. (1935); E.F. 1070.4 (Mirkine-Guetz6vitch). The text of the new
constitution of September 3, 1937, is reprinted in Informations constitutionnelles et parlementaries of November 15, 1937, no. 15, 288 ff. (i937).
On constitutional evolution in the Baltic States in general see: Graham, Stability in the
Baltic States, in Buell, New Governments in Europe 279 ff. (Estonia), 286 ff. (Latvia), 290 ff.
(Lithuania) (1934); Montfort, Le droit constitutionnel des nouveaux 6tats de la Baltique
orientale, in I Annales de l'Institut du droit public compar6 de l'Universit6 de Paris 41 ff.
(N934). The best information on the postwar situation in the Baltic States is found in Tibal,
Les problkmes politiques contemporaines de l'Europe orientale, Centre Europ~en de la Dotation Carnegie (1929).
74On Latvia see Tartarin-Tarnheyden, op. cit. supranote73, at 257 if.; E.F. 070.5 (MirkineGuetz6vitch). The project of a new presidential constitution (submitted in x934) which legal-
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present under an extra-constitutional system of authoritarian regime in
which the president and the government, as his aids, have completely
absorbed the functions of the former legislative bodies. In 1936, in both
countries some kind of representation without party participation, on
corporate lines in Latvia and on the basis of administrafive bodies in
Lithuania, were created. To the same class, although previously existing
parliamentary institutions have not been discontinued, belongs to date
the kingdom of Yugoslavia.75 The constitution of 1931, "legalizing" the
coup d'etat of King Alexander in 1929, shows the color of royal absolutism
or "rWgi-ne personnel" familiar in the Balkan; no secret vote exists for the
Parliament which, elected on the one-party ticket, is little more than a
recording machine of the government, carrying out the wishes of the
Crown. Once more, similarly as in Poland, widespread dissatisfaction of a
profoundly democratic nation indicates that the Regency installed after
King Alexander's assassination, may be compelled to restore the lost
democratic institutions at least in part. A similar predominance of the
Royal executive is secured in Rumania where the king controls the cabinet
and the cabinet controls the parliament, by virtue of the so-called "40%law" which assigns automatically 50% of all parliamentary seats to the
party which obtains 40o of the total vote at the elections7 sa The coup
d' tat of 1938 abolished the parliament together with the political parties
and established a royal dictatorship without any pseudo-parliamentary
trappings. Of the two other royal dictatorships on the Balkan, Greece,
after the King's coup d'etat in August, 1936, is operated as dictatorship outright in which all political parties have been outlawed and parliamentary
institutions are in abeyance. Bulgaria, on the other hand, having tried to
exist, after the King's coup d'etat in May, 1934, for several years under a
system of royal dictatorship, without parties and parliamentary organization, at present evidently seeks the way back to more constitutional
processes of government.
izes the existing rule of the president, has not yet been put in force; see also law of May 12,
1936. Informations constitutionnelles et parlementaires, 1936, no. 3, 44.
On the present situation in Lithuania see E.F. 1070.5 (Mirkine-Guetz6vitch); Annual
Register 1936 2oS-2o6. (Epstein ed. i937).
75On the constitution of Yugoslavia of 1931 see Pribitch6vitch, La dictature du roi Alexandre (1933); Loutzitch, La constitution du Royaume de Yagoslavie du 9 septembre 1931
(1933). E.F. 1090.4 (Pernot).
7s On the "Acerbo"-system see Steiner, op. cit. supra note 62, at 73. On the electoral techniques in Yugoslavia see Cemerlic, Les syst~mes 6lectoraux en Yugoslavie (1937). On the
Rumanian electoral law see Braunias, op. cit. supra note 35, at 457 ff.; Ascente, Essai sur le
regime reprsentatif en Roumanie (1937).
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CONSTITUTIONAL STATES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TYPE:
THE UNITED STATES

Within the category of the constitutional state, a specific pattern of the
relationship between legislative and executive is presented by the state
advisedly organized under the separation of powers. The government of
the United States76 is commonly considered as the outstanding, and, if
we disregard distortions of the pattern in Latin America, as the only existing example for the time being. Separation of powers is deemed to prevail because the president as the head of the executive is virtually irremovable during his term (except by impeachment) and because the cabinet, appointed by him and responsible to him alone, is beyond influence
and control of Congress. Consequently, incompatibility exists between
the offices of member of Congress and of member of the administration.
Secondly, the president and the ministers or heads of the departments
appointed by him, are barred, at least theoretically, from exercising legal
influence over Congress. In addition, since the courts are independent
of both the executive and legislative agencies, the scheme of Montesquieu seems to have materialized in the constitutional frame of the greatest republic of modem times. Actually, however, as is generally known,
the practice of the American democracy is widely different from this conceptual model. The connecting link between executive and legislative is
the party in power, that is the party which, under the two-party system,
has been victorious at the last presidential elections. The president is the
recognized if not the official leader of his party through which, as a rule,
he is in a position to impose his political intentions upon both assemblies
as a whole and in particular upon the permanent committees which guide
the legislative assemblies as such. At times this equilibfium is disturbed
by a change in the composition of the majority in the powerful Senate
when the periodical renewal of one-third of its members upsets the political equilibrium, or even when the intervening elections destroy the ascendancy of the presidential party over the House of Representatives.
In spite of frequent delays and temporary deadlocks this arrangement of
6'The following discussion of the constitutional situation in the United States as well as
other references to this country covers, of course, familiar ground. The importance for the
line of thought pursued in this article lies in the attempt to incorporate American constitutional developments into the universal trend of strengthening the powers of the executive
as against the legislative, a trend which in this country is emphasized as well as complicated by
the parallel evolution of increasing federal powers as against the states. It siems that also in
terms of constitutional law a "splendid isolation" or "aloofness" from universal features of
the constitutional state is no longer feasible. Therein lies, in the author's opinion, the intrinsic
importance of the "New Deal." For foreign viewpoints on the "experiment Roosevelt" see
E.F. 070.9-12 (Cestre) (and literature E.F. io B-27).
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powers has worked surprisingly well through generations because usually
a compromise between conflicting political interests would be agreed on
which, to be sure, may fall into conflict but which nevertheless are animated by common loyalty toward the fundamentals of the common political society.
It is on this background of traditional equilibrum that the constitutional tendencies of the United States since 1933 should be soberly examined. That the president was forced to assume leadership over Congress after his election in 1933 was due to the inadequate handling of the
economic depression by the outgoing administration. No constitutional
anomalies were involved when Congress consented to enlarging the executive powers for the sake of dealing expeditiously and elastically with the
depression. The constitutional crisis around the New Deal has not been
caused, as in most political deadlocks in Europe, by inherent deficiencies
of the constitutional structure itself. It is true that the present administration, when attempting to cope with the crisis in terms of state intervention in the economic process for the sake of a more equitable distribution of risks, found itself caught by the traditional non-collectivist interpretation of the constitution through the Supreme Court. It would certainly be an unwarranted reversal of cause and effect to assume that the
faulty construction of the constitution is responsible for the deadlock. In
the light of current developments in Europe it is incontestable that the
constitution itself, by way of an elastic -wrongly called "liberal"-interpretation, would have offered all essential presuppositions for complying
with the two fundamental postulates of constitutional government, that
is enough leeway for efficient leadership by the president on the one hand,
and the mechanism for effective control over the administration by the
people and their representatives on the other hand.
Seen from the angle of universal constitutional trends from which no
country be it ever so well balanced may escape, the events since 1933 have
emphasized the plebiscitary effects of the presidential election by the
people which, for similarly impelling reasons, in several European states
recently has been substituted for election of the head of the state by the
parliament.7 Since the political weight of popular election coincided with
the imponderables of a strong personality in the presidential office the
balance of powers as envisaged by the constitution was at once converted
into genuine leadership of President Roosevelt. Hence the unmistakable
ascendancy of the executive over the legislative as it was visible during the
77E.g., Austria (reform of 1929); Estonia and Latvia (reforms of 1934); Poland (constitution of 1935); Irish Free State (constitution of 1937).
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President's first term. This incalculable human element, and not the
mechanism of abstract constitutional provisions helps to explain that
from 1933 to 1937 congressional government has become eclipsed by

presidential government. Leadership here as everywhere is a product of
personality and not of structural arrangements of the constitutional
charter.
Another point, however, seems more important for the scope of this
study. It must be remembered that the setback administered to the social
reconstruction program commonly known as the New Deal during the
first term of the President, was by no means a consequence of a structural
maladjustment of the relationship between executive and legislative from
which almost all of the constitutional crises in Europe sprang. On the
contrary, the large majority of the Democratic party in Congress has enabled the President to pursue his political intentions not unlike the leadership of a British cabinet supported by an unassailable majority in the
House of Commons. The administrative program was temporarily delayed owing to the particular composition of the Supreme Court which as
such was wholly accidental. In view of the popular adherence to the
President's personality and program as evidenced by the vote for his
second term in November 1936, it was at least not against the spirit of
the constitution that the administration should try to remove, by the
court reform proposal, an obstacle which was less structural than personal.
One may disagree about the wisdom or practicability of the means adopted for this end. The two parallels of the threat of the British cabinet to
break the obstruction of the Lords to popularly desired constitutional
reforms, in 1832 and 1911, may be adduced as pertinent illustrations for

the application of lawful pressure against equally lawful resistance. It is
only at this juncture the real issue of the balance between executive and
legislative power so familiar in Europe becomes acute also in this country.
Congress, supported by a considerable section of public opinion otherwise
favorable to the administration, re-asserted its constitutional independence from the executive when the President announced his court reform
plan in February, i937. The plan-perhaps too tenaciously upheld by
the President-failed. Although, viewed from a wider vista, the court
reform by itself appears only as a minor episode in the far-reaching social
reconstruction Which is under way also in the United States, the parliamentary opposition against the plan even within the President's own party
in Congress shows clearly that the universal trend of strengthening the
executive as against the legislative has been, for the time being, frustrated
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or at least delayed in the United States7 8 Thus the second basic principle
of constitutional government was reaffirmed, that of effective popular
control over the leadership vested constitutionally in the President. Although politically the President has succeeded in converting the court
minority into a majority presumably favorable to his program, the important fact remains, that Congress when unwilling to be convinced cannot be coerced by the executive, not even through the powerful medium
8
of party and party patronage.7 a
Another aspect, however, on which much light could be gained by referring to European developments is the relationship between Congress
and the electorate. The realization of the will of the people as expressed
by the overwhelming majority for the President at the preceding elections
of November 1936 has been sidetracked or even frustrated by Congress.
Owing to the absence of dissolution in this country the House of Representatives rises to actual ascendancy over the electorate, which, between
elections, can exercise only extra-constitutional pressure on its representatives. Such influence, is on the whole, less effective than direct pressure
by organized lobbying. Here the original structure of the separation of
powers clearly comes through the texture of party dynamics which otherwise mitigate possible shocks of disagreement between the powers. In any
country operated on the basis of genuine parliamentarism the electorate
would have been called upon to decide the issue between Congress and the
President who justly may have felt that he moved within the limits of his
plebiscitary mandate.
Summarizing the present situation on the background of general trends
it may safely be said that in the United States presidential leadership,
more factual than definable in terms of constitutional law, has not resulted
in the predominance of the executive over the legislative branch as everywhere else in Europe. Under the present constitution, there is no trace
of dictatorial or quasi-dictatorial powers of the president as it has been
demagogically asserted. The executive in this country is by far less powerful than the British cabinet or any other democratic executive in Europe,
with the possible exception of France. Moreover, it should be noted that
the non-existence of the parliamentary system gives to the constitutional
78The incident of the appointment of Mr. Justice Black has no immediate bearing upon
the problems discussed in the text because the President acted entirely within the range of his
constitutional discretion-performing an "ade de gouvernement" (see p. 567 supra,and note 2)in submitting his choice to the Senate.
78a Note the fate of the Reorganization bill early in 1938. See Binidey, The Powers of the

President (1937).
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practice in this country a less democratic appearance than in some other
democracies where the will of the people as reflected by the general elections reacts immediately upon both executive and legislative without being diluted by the parliament as in the United States. The more or less
accidental configuration which is responsible for checking both the executive and the legislative by the third power, the judiciary, unorthodox as it
appears under the doctrine of the separation of powers, is not likely to be
perpetuated and may not re-occur for a long time to come.
CONSTITUTIONAL STATES OF THE PARLIAMENTARY TYPE

The essential feature of government in states operated under the parliamentary system7 9 proper is the close collaboration and integration of
the legislative and the executive in forming the will of the state. The executive participates in and even dominates the process of law-making by
the rights of legislative initiative and especially of appropriation, which
amount frequently to actual monopoly of legislative control. On the
other hand, the parliament bears upon the government by the various
methods of political control developed under the parliamentary system.
The doctrine that the cabinet is nothing more than a committee, agent or
delegate of the legislative as expounded on the basis of British premises
by Bagehot 8o belongs as much to the past as the supremacy of the parliament over the cabinet itself. 8' With the exception of France, nothing of
the classical concept of parliamentary sovereignty has outlived war and
crisis.
Great Britain.-Most indicative of the changed situation is the trans8
formation which parliamentary government has undergone in England. 2
The focal point of British parliamentarism consists in determining the
79For literature see note 17 supra.
8o Bagehot, The English Constitution (first published in the Fortnightly Review in i865),
no. I.; on Bagehot see Marriott, op. cit. supranote 16, at 480 ff.
81See Loewenstein, op. cit. supra note 48.
82The leading authority today on English government is Jennings, Cabinet Government
(936). See also Low, The Governance of England (3rd ed. igio); Wade and Phillips, op. cit.
supranote ii, at 33 if., 148 ff.; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution (1935); 2 Finer,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 949 ff.; Ogg, English Government and Politics 59 if., '43 ff., 448 ff.
(1930). Spencer, Government and Politics Abroad 15 ff. (i936); Lowell, The Government of
England (1912); Redslob, op. cit. supra note 14, at 12 ff.; Loewenstein, Verfassungsleben in
Grossbritannien, 20 Jahrbuch des 5ffentlichen Rechts i95 ff., 267 ff., 28o ff. (1932). Simon,
Quelques rfflexions sur le regime parlementaire en Grande Bretagne, .Revue du droit public 172 ff. (1935); Sirieuaen, Le regime parlementaire anglais contemporain (1935); Savel-

kouls, Das englische Kabinettsystem (1934) (an amusing attempt to discover the National
Socialist "leadership-principle" in the English constitution).
E.F. io68.6-io (Smellie).
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majority party through the device of the general election, held at intervals fixed by statute, or irregularly by way of ministerial dissolution. Between the elections, however, the leaders of the victorious majority party,
organized as the cabinet under the genuine leadership of the Prime Minister, exercise factually almost unlimited powers not only over the opposition, but also over the government party through party discipline and the
threat of dissolution. This practice of what amounts to "constitutional
dictatorship" was made possible in England by avoiding the dangers and
vices of the multiple party formation,5' by stubbornly maintaining the
crude and theoretically unfair system of majority election in the individual constituencies, and most of all, by the awareness of the strong values
of tradition among governors and governed. At rare occasions, but scarcely ever in fundamentals, the cabinet is compelled to recede classically
before what is called a "revolt of backbenchers" indicating, beyond the
professional criticism of the opposition, a serious trend in public opinion
averse to the particular measure5 4 By an altogether singular coincidence
of the spirit of traditional stability and of the technique of adjustment
Great Britain has succeeded in establishing the undisputed and at all
times workable leadership of the executive while the democratic processes
as such were left unaffected. The solution of the abdication crisis in 1936
is, in a way, a model demonstration of cabinet leadership over both public
opinion and parliament. No unbiased observer, however, could be mistaken, that parliamentarism of this type is the unique achievement of one
country alone and as a general pattern not to be imitated by or applied
to other countries less experienced and less given to moderation and compromise than the British.
In this connection attention should be called to the Irish constitution
of 1937 which evidently tries to square the circle between presidential and
parliamentary government of the British type. Responsibility of the government toward the parliament is coupled with increased and independent
powers of the popularly elected president. It remains to be seen whether
this interesting experiment for reconciling genuine parliamentarism to
genuine leadership of the executive will yield better results than similar
efforts in Germany before 1933,5 or whether the constitution cut to fit
the person of Mr. De Valera will be too large for any one of his successors.
83Loewenstein, Minderheitsregierung in Grossbritannien (1925).
84Recent illustrations are the Incitement to Disaffection bill (934) and the Hoare-Laval
incident (1935); see Jennings, op. cit. supra note 82, at 365-66; see also Loewenstein, op. cit.
supra note 82, at 277 ff.
85See p. 572 supra, and notes 19 and 20.
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France.-According to competent observers the parliamentary system
in its genuine or authentic form has never existed in France of the Third
Republic because of the desuetude of presidential or ministerial dissolution, by which the electorate may become the arbiter of conflicts between
government and parliament. 6 To date, republican France is evidently
the only country in which parliamentary supremacy as the heir of classical
Jacobin traditions and conceptions was able to maintain itself.5 7 Its permanent and glaring deficiencies as a form of political government-which,
incidentally, do little to impair the efficiency as a system of administration,-are too well known to be discussed here at length. Conspicuous features are instability of cabinets85 -the shifting of cabinet personnel has, on
the other hand, its definite advantages,-and the complete lack of control
and power of the electorate between general elections. Both are caused, in
the last analysis, by the absence of effective party organization and discipline inside and outside of parliament. Hence the incessant repetition of
crises under the French parliamentarism, resulting in loss of prestige and
strength in the international and the national field. In brief, the political
apparatus controlled by the parliamentary oligarchy has failed to give to
France what this revolutionary era demands most, namely political leadership. It is undeniable, however, that for this situation French national
temperament and historical tradition are more responsible than a faulty
construction of the constitutional mechanism which, when applied to
other countries, did yield satisfactory results as in Czechoslovakia. 89 One
remembers that in France strong presidents failed as MacMahon in
86R. Redslob, op. cit. supranote i4, at 156 ff., 256 ff.
87 For an authoritative statement of the classical French doctrine concerning the supremacy
of parliament see Carr6 de Malberg, La loi, expression de la volont6 g~n&rale 2o ff., 175 ff.

(1931).

On parliamentary government in France see Barth~lemy-Duez, op. cit. supra note i, at
68o ff., 712 ff.; Capitant, La r~forme du parlementarisme (1934); Gordon, Les nouvelles
constitutions Europ~ennes et le r6le du chef de l'6tat (1932); 1 Esmein-N~zard, op. cit. supra
note I, at 258 ff.; vol. ii, at 274 ff.; Haikal, op. cit. supra in note 5, at 40 ff.; Siegfried, Tableau des partis en France (1930), Redslob, op. cit. supra note 14, at x56 ff.; Finer, op. cit.
supra note 5, at io48 ff.; Valeur, in Buell, Democratic Governments in Europe 261 ff.
(1935); Spencer, op. cit. supra note 82, at 177 ff.; Braunias, Staatskrise und Staatsreform
in Frankreich, 23 Jahrbuch des 6ffentlichen Rechts 72 ff. (1936). E.F. lO3O.5 (Carr6 de
Malberg); io68.2 (Barth~lemy); io69.r (Gordon).
88See Haikal, op. cit. supra note 5, at 302 ff.; Marion, Les minist~res du second cartel en
(1933); Aubert, Le moulin parlementaire (1933); Tardieu, Sur la pente (1935); Finer,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 7054 ff.; Valeur, op. cit. supranote 87, at 315 ff.; Lindsay, Ministerial
Instability in France, 46 Pol. Sci. Q. 46 ff. (1931).
89 See Sander, op. cit. supra note 23, at 268 ff.; Burdeau, op. cit. supra note 17, at 1o8 ff.;
Beuve-M&y, Les nouvelles tendances du droit public tsch6choslovaque, in Annales de
l'Institut droit public compar6 de l'Universit6 de Paris 99 ff. (1936). E.F. 1078.8, 9 (Miseaux).
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187790 and Millerand in 19249' and that only Poincar6's personality
achieved in 1926 what Doumergue was unable to perform in 1934.92
Doumergue's attempts to strengthen the executive power by restoring to
the president and the cabinet the right of dissolution independent from
the assent of the Senate, and by monopolizing financial powers of expenditure in the hands of the government would have been, if successful,
France's contribution to the universal trend toward greater government
powers.
Moreover, it is significant that also the experiment undertaken by the
FrontConnnun ' thus far has not succeeded in revitalizing the French parliamentary system. Real political leadership was to be established by the
orthodox method of creating a stronger basis for parliamentary government by a lasting coalition of both voters and parties within and outside
of parliament. The mirage of a working two-party system-the Common
Front as a liberal-socialist combination against a more conservative bloc
of the right-was at least outlined on the political horizon. But, seen
from a less ephemeral aspect, more important is the fact that, in June,
1937, and in April, 1938, M. Leon Blum's cabinet was forced to retreat before a Senate reluctant to concede to a socialist leader pleins pouvoirs
which were readily granted to M. Chautemps. The incidents indicate that
the power of the parliamentary oligarchy entrenched in the Senate is far
from being subdued and that even the unbroken majority of the Front
Commurn was unable to continue the cumbersome parliamentary technique of statute-making by the full body of the assemblies. Refuge has to
be taken, as before, in the emergency measure of pleins pouvoirs in order
to carry out the legislation for dealing with the crisis. The technical device of conferring the needed powers to the government by way of an
Enabling Act may spell also in France the doom to the classical type of
90 On

the first (and last) dissolution of the French Chamber since 1875 see Reclus, Le seize

mai (1931).
91On Millerand's conflict with the chamber see Finer, op. cit. supra note 5, at ii4o ff.
92On the "exp~riment Doumergue," see Haikal, op. cit. supra note s, at 243 ff.;
Barth~lemy, La constitution Doumergue, Revue politique et parlementaire 1934, P. 245 ff.;
B. Mirkine-Guetzfvitch, Constitutional reform in France, 6 Political Quarterly 98 ff. (935);
Valeur, op. cit., supra note 87, at 532 ff.; Braunias, op. cit. supranote 87, at io5 ff.
On constitutional reform in France see Joseph-Barth6lemy, Valeur de la libert6 et adaptation & la r~publique 178 ff. (x935); Haikal, op. cit. supranote 5, at 448 ff.; Blum, La rfforme
gouvernementale (936); Tardieu, La r~forme de l'6tat (1933); Tardieu, L'heure de la decision
(i934); Bardoux, La France de demain (1936); Ordinaire, La r6vision de la constitution
(1934); Romain, Le plan du 9 juillet (1935); M6lot, op. cit. supra note 17, at 226.
93 Sharp, The Popular Front in France: Prelude or Interlude, 30 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 857
ff. (936); Haikal, op. cit. supra note 5, at 266 ff.
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parliamentary government, or, to be more hesitant in conclusions, it may
inaugurate a fundamental transformation of the relationship between
executive and legislative in states operated by parliamentarism.
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM AND THE TECHNIQUE OF
THE "PLEINS POUVOIRS"

The present situation in almost all countries faithful to the principles
of parliamentary government is characterized by the fact that no longer
is stabilization of the government by the support of strong parliamentary
coalitions sought. The parties behind the government would be strong
enough to carry out the policies of the cabinet against any possible combination of the opposition. Nonetheless the strong parliamentary majority commits that act of self-abdication of legislative functions called pleins
pouvoirs94 or Enabling Act by which the government assumes the plenitude of legislative powers instead of and in the place of the parliament.
Moreover, such delegation of legislative authority is granted not for a
specific purpose and within the limits of specified instructions, but it is
conferred in general, without any limitations other than purely formal and
for any objective whatever unspecified at the time of granting. Such powers are by no means a substitute for constitutional emergency powers
(Nolverordnungsrecht),9scustomarily accepted in times of war or When parliament is physically prevented from assembling. At first forced upon recalcitrant parliaments as a stop-gap or makeshift of pragmatic nature
the device of the Enabling Act seems to emerge from the crisis as the new
technical basis for executive leadership which, while preserving the ultimate political responsibility of the freely elected representatives of the
94On the pleins pouvoirs or Enabling Acts which form the legal basis for the decrets-lois a
vast literature exists in almost all countries under parliamentary government. One of the best
monographs is by Tingst~n, Les pleins pouvoirs (1934) (with extensive literature on p. 345 ft.).
Compare in addition, Gouet, La question constitutionnelle des pr6tendus dcrets-lois (1932);
Haikal, op. cit. supranote 5, at 68 ff., 422 ff.; Bonnard, Les dcrets-lois du minist~re Poincar6 en
1926, Revue du droit public 248 ff. (1927); Barth6lemy-Duez, op. cit. supra note 5, at igs ff.,
779 ff. (bibliography on p. 250, 781); Mirkine-Guetz6vitch, op. cit. supra note 17, at 78 ff.;
Jize, L'excutif en temps de guerre (1917); Carr6 de Malberg, op. cit. supra note 87, at 79 ff.;
Eisennann, Die Theorie von der d6legation l6gislative in der franz6sischen Rechtslehre, ii
Zeitschrift ffir 6ffentliches Recht 334 ff. (1935). For an excellent study of a more limited section of the problem see Jacoby, Delegation of Powers and Judicial Review, 36 Col. L. Rev.
871 ff. (1936). The eventual unconstitutionality of ordinances on the basis of the delegation of
legislative powers, because of lack of powers to delegate, or because of excessive application of
delegated powers, is, of course, only one aspect among many others of the whole complex of
delegation.
9sOn emergency powers provided for the constitution see Friedrich, op. cit. supra note i,
at 208 ff. (with literature on p. 534); Barth~lemy-Duez, op. cit. supra note 5, at 240 ff.; Gouet,
op. cit. supranote 94, at 163 ff.
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people, confides to the government of the day wide-range legislative powers, in addition to the freedom of executive action. What appeared not
long ago as a temporary expedient for extraordinary situations becomes
more and more a regular institution of democratic, though no longer parliamentary government, as shown by recent experience in almost all democratic countries. Pleins pouvoirs are not granted to governments with a
precarious parliamentary standing, but, on the contrary, only to cabinets
which otherwise would be strong enough to carry out their program by
ordinary parliamentary methods. But the necessity of swift and efficient
action commends the practice of government by decree for situations in
which the time-consuming and cumbrous technique of parliamentary discussion and deliberation is deemed unsuited. Moreover, the success of
statutory intervention in economic life frequently depends on its secrecy
in preparation or imposition by surprise and long-drawn parliamentary
debates may frustrate its objectives and provoke the resistance of selfish
interests using their parliamentary exponents for blocking and delaying
the measure. Apparently for state interventionism the appropriate method is that of the Enabling Act.
It is beyond doubt that the Enabling Acts or pleins pouvoirs have no
theoretical justification and legal basis in the various democratic constitutions 96 which are still dominated by the obsolete conception of a dear-cut
96In France the courts have no power of judicial review of statutes which are considered as
the supreme type of legislature acts; constitutional objections to the Enabling Acts proper
thus are reserved to parliamentary debates and the "doctrine" of constitutional lawyers (see
Jacoby, op. cit. supra note 94, at 88o); but since the "d6cret-loi" is formally a "rglement" of
the President, the Conseil d'Etat took jurisdiction over the individual ordinances by way of
"recours parexcis des pouvoirs"; the change in attitude was inaugurated by the celebrated case
of Compagnies de l'Est, du Midi, du Nord, du Paris-Lyon-M~iterran6, de l'Orl6ans et de
l'Ouest, December 6, 1907 (Recueil 913 ff.). Thus the decret-loi factually came under the scope
of judicial review for administrative acts although the basic problem of constitutionality of
the delegation proper is still immune from the courts. On the whole, the French doctrine still
maintains the theory of non-delegability although it is now generally admitted that emergency
situations have constantly overridden the classical division of powers as established by a written constitution laid down as early as in 1894 by Esmein. Plainspouvoirs therefore have become accepted as customary law (Jacoby, 874 ff.); see, e.g., Barth61emy-Duez, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 779 if.; Tingstfn, op. cit. supra note 94, at 17 if.; Gouet, op. cit. supra note 94, at
199

if. On the other hand Carr6 de Malberg (E.F. 1030.7) justifies the pleins pouvairs on the

basis of the unconditioned supremacy of the legislative power which implies freedom of delegation.
For Czechoslovakia see Jacoby, op. cit. supra note 94, at 893 ff.; Sander, Verfassungsurkunde und Verfassungszustand in der Tschechoslovakischen Republik 135 ff. (1935); BeuveMary, op. cit. supra note 89, at 113 ff. For the Weimar constitution in Germany see Jacoby,
op. cit. supra note 94, at 885 ff.; Tingst~n, op. cit. supra note 94, at 287 ff.; Anschtitz-Thoma,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 310 ff. (Schoenborn).

For Belgium see Speyer, op. cit. supra in note 67, at 38 ff.; Tingst6n, op. cit. supra note 94,
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division between executive and legislative functions. At the time when
most of the constitutions originated, emergency powers of the government
without recurrence to parliamentary collaboration were considered either
as a residue of or relapse into the absolutist spirit of monarchy and such
devices were averse to Western concepts of constitutionalism. Within the
hierarchy of legislative acts, the ordinance-making power of the government for the purpose of executing the laws was strictly subordinated to
the regular parliamentary statute. But in no country did abstract objections of constitutional lawyers and parliamentary fundamentalists prevail over the dire necessity of carrying on the government, in time of acute
tension, by unorthodox methods. The courts, even if they had the power
of challenging the constitutionality ofdecrees as a substitute for regular
statutes, dodged the issue by legal interpretation and extension of the
ordinance-making powers of the government, or they acquiesced to the
practice.9 7 It would have been clearly within the province of the legislative bodies themselves to refute the practice of the decret-loi. Thus even
thoroughly democratic states which are beyond the reproach of authoritarian leanings such as France, Belgium, or Czechoslovakia, have assented
to the technique of Enabling Acts as a recurrent feature of governmental
predominance, or are in search for workable formulas for this new development.
In France9s the practice of government decrees by pleins pouvoirs, inat 142 ff.; Jacoby, op. cit. supra note 94, at 875 note 15; Annuaire de l'Institut International
de droit public 1935, 473 ff.
(1936) (Rolin).
For Switzerland see Giacometti, Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungspraxis in der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Festgabe (Fleiner) 45 if., 74 if. (1937); Fleiner, Verfassungsrecht
und Gesetzesdelegation 31 ff. (1928). See p. 603 infra.
97 This is the general experience for example in France; see Haikal, op. cit. suprain note 5,
p. 420 ff., 433; Barthilemy-Duez, op. cit. supra note 5, at 781, Jacoby, op. cit. supra note
94, passim. As to the legal character of d~crets-lois: (a) They have the rank and validity of
formal laws that is they may affect or modify even previous statutory enactments; (b) Until
ratification by the parliament ("habilitation")they are considered as ordinances ("rgleinents")
and as such they are subject to the judicial review of administrative acts by the Council of
State; (c) After repeal by the parliament they are deprived of validity only ex ,zunc; (d)After
ratification by the parliament they are formal statutes that is they may be modified only by
formal parliamentary act and they are beyond judicial review; consequently, actions instituted
before ratification are dismissed.

98The pleins pouvoirs were granted in the following instances (see also Haikal, op. cit. supra
note 5,at 422 ff.): March 22, 1924 (granted to Poincar6 for a financial emergency, the powers
became practically overruled by the election in May in which Poincar6's cabinet was beaten.)
August 3, 1924 (granted, until December 31, 1926, to Poincar6, for dealing with a financial
crisis); February 28, 1935 (granted to Doumergue's cabinet of "National Union," until June
30, 1934 and renewed on July 6, 1934 for political and financial reasons). In May and June
1935, the chamber refused to grant similar powers to the cabinets of Flandin and Buisson. On
June 9, 1935 "poUvoirs exceptionnels" were granted, until January 1,1936, to M. Laval "en
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augurated, to a limited extent, during the war, was utilized again for real
emergency situations and for strictly limited purposes, in 1924 and 1926.
Following these precedents, the cabinets of Doumergue, in 1934, and of
M. Laval, in 1935, applied the powers on an unprecedented scale even for
administrative and judicial reforms not at all connected with the economic
objectives for which they had been granted originally. In both 1937 and
1938 the powers accorded to the cabinets of M. Chautemps and M.
Daladier were of the widest possible range and once more involved a complete self-abdication of the Chambers. 99
In Czechoslovakiao ° although the government has never experienced
lack of parliamentary majorities, the practice of government decrees began in 1933. Intended for limited periods, the powers were regularly renewed before expiration. Executive legislation has continued ever since
although by no means did the National Assembly surrender the ordinary
law-making function altogether.
The situation is similar in Belgium, another country of traditional parliamentary structure.10° Continuously since 1932, the government, backed
by the three great parties of the Catholics, Liberals and Socialists, has
used the special powers conferred by general Enabling Acts mainly for
economic tasks in general, but also for specific purposes such as the enactment of a comprehensive piece of legislation. The ordinary legislative
functions of the parliament were, however, not discontinued. Again, the
government exercises legislative functions concurrently with the parliament. Even Luxembourg, in 1935, resorted to this new device of govern02
ment ordinances in the place of ordinary parliamentary statutes.
vue d'hiter la dtvaluation de la monnaie," "pour lutter contre la sp~culation et pour defendre le

franc." See also Gignoux, La politique de dgcrets-lois, Revue politique et parlementaire, October io,1935.

99Law of June 21, 1937, granted to M. Chautemps, after the request of M. Blum had been
refused by the Senate; law of April 14, 1938, granted to M. Daladier.
zooExamples of such sweeping delegations in Czechoslovakia are: laws of June 9, 1933
(SIg. no. 95); of November i1, 1933 (no. 206); of June 21, 1934 (no. iog); of June 26, 1935
(no. 131); see also Annuaire de l'Institut International de droit public 459 if. (1937); Jacoby,
op. cit. supra note 94, at 893 if., Beuve-M~ry, op. cit. supra note 89, at iii ff.
, Examples in Belgium are: Laws of July i6, 1926; of December 30, 1932; of May 17,
1933; of July 30, 1934; of December 7, 1934; of March 15, 1935; of March 30, 1936. Powers

were usually granted for six months and renewed before expiration. Thus, with the exception
of fifteen days in 1935, Belgium has been under special powers uninterruptedly since 1932.
See also Tingst~n, op. cit. supra note 94, at 134 ff.; Jacoby, op. cit. supra note 94, at 875,
M61ot,op. cit. supranote 17, 134 ff.; Dor and Moreau, Les tendances actuelles du droit public

et du droit priv6, Revue de l'Institut Beige du droit compar6 1o8 ff.
(1936); Annuaire de l'Institut International de droit public 1935, 473 if.; 1936, 118 ft.
- Luxembourg, law of May 5, 1935; see Informations constitutionnelles et parlementaires,
no. 2/1936, 37.
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In England pleins pouvoirsin the full meaning of the term are unknown
although Enabling Acts for specific purposes are widely resorted to."°3
In all countries under observation the Enabling Act has the common
feature of conferring upon the government, by way of a sweeping delegation, to do all that is necessary to cope with a particular situation
which is usually referred to in the most general terms. Frequently though
not invariably such decrees are promulgated under the authority of the
nominal head of the state (Crown or President); actually they are drafted
by the cabinet itself with or without collaboration of ad hoc summoned
experts outside of the ministerial bureaucracy. Decrees enacted under
such delegation may derogate and supersede even full-fledged parliamentary statutes. As to their scope, the pleins pouvoirs sometimes try to set
limits by referring to specific emergency situations or, less frequently, to
a particular purpose of economic nature. In practice, however, many of
the decrees issued present only a very remote relation to the purpose stated in the act. 0 4 Occasionally the parliaments seek to exclude specific matters from the range of the Enabling Act by imposing some material limitations upon the government. °5" The only restriction thus far regularly im-

posed upon the government refers to the time limit for the exercise of
extraordinary powers by the government; the necessity of renewing the
powers evidently implies a method of control by the parliament. The
time limit varies from a couple of months to a full year. Extensions have
been granted so regularly that the Enabling Acts have become a permanent feature of the legislative process.
03 Delegation for limited and special purposes is considered as a necessary incident of governmental powers. See Tingst~n, op. cit. supranote 94, 175 ff.; Jacoby, op. cit. supra note 94,
at 881 ff.; Allen, op. cit. supra note 29, at 304ft.; Loewenstein, op. cit. supranote 29, at 297 if. The
practice of more general delegation was adopted in connection with the economic crisis in 1931
by McDonald's second national government; see on these instances Loewenstein, op. cit.,
supra note 29, at 303 ff., and Jacoby, 883 note 31. Legal objections are raised if the powers so
delegated are excessive, such as placing ordinances issued on the basis of the Enabling Acts
beyond control of the courts by statutory declarations contained in the act, or when ordinances
are interfering with regular statutory enactments proper, or when the orders are dealing with
"matters of principle" reserved for parliament. See also note 29 supra.

"04The French Journal Officiel of October 3x, 1935 published no fewer than 367 decrees of
the most heterogeneous kind many of which were in no relation at all to the purpose indicated
in the Enabling Act itself. In Belgium, within the last half of the year 1934 58 arr~t~s were
issued. In Czechoslovakia, to the end of 1936 the figure of ordinances exceeds 400.
105 For example, in Czechoslovakia the Enabling Act of June 9, 1933 (SIg. no. 95) forbade interference with the currency and levying of taxes by decree. When in June 1937 the French
Senate tried to restrict the pleins pouvoirs demanded by the cabinet of M. Blum, the government resigned rather than accept material limitations. The cabinet of M. Chautemps, however, received the powers unconditionally.
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Control of the parliament is provided for by the provision recurrent in
all similar acts that all decrees issued under the special powers are to be
laid before parliament which may or may not repeal them. Since most
of the decrees are of a more than transitory nature, it has proved to be impractical to insert the clause that decrees unless ratified by parliament
lose their validity automatically. Parliament may refuse, however, their
ratification, or it may demand their abolition. If ratified the decree becomes an ordinary statute, if not ratified it may at least continue as having the force of an ordinance. Experience shows that the right of demanding repeal is rarely used °6 because the situation regulated by the decree
could not be changed ex tunw without gravely affecting actions undertaken,
in the meantime, by private individuals in good faith in the validity of the
decree. Since the parliament usually is not prepared to assume responsibility for outright repeal while at the same time unwilling to convert, by
formal ratification, the decree-laws into regular statutes, as a rule nothing
at all is done. Thus the position of parliament toward the governmental
legislation is similar to the acquiescent attitude of the British parliament
toward ministerial legislation which, in recent times, has grown to paramount importance for the administration of Great Britain. Virtually the
parliament possesses political control over the executive legislation, actually it wisely refrains from using it. During the exercise of such delegated
powers parliament may even be adjourned and the government decrees
thus become the exclusive source of legislation. Sometimes concurrent
powers of the government do not exclude ordinary legislation by the parliament which, however, is confined to less urgent and less controversial
matters.
THE EXECUTIVE IN SWITZERLAND
7
In this connection the present constitutional situation in Switzerland"'
deserves special consideration. Since .1874, that well-balanced country

106The d~crets-lois, issued by the cabinet of Doumergue during I934, were ratified, by a
close majority, as late as in February 1935, when his successor, M. Flandin, insisted on a definite assumption of responsibility by the chamber; see Haikal, op. cit., supra note 5, 433. On
the other hand, the parliament, although the decrees issued by Poincar6 in 1926 were duly submitted, delayed ratification ad ca/endas Graecas;see Barth~lemy-Duez, op. cit. supra note i,
at 781.
X07On recent constitutional developments in Switzerland see Giacometti, Verfassungsrecht
und Verfassungspraxis, in Festgabe (Fleiner) 45 ff. (1937); Spencer, op. cit. supra note 82, at
413 ff.; Buell, Democratic Governments in Europe 557 ff. (1935); Tingst~n, op. cit. supra note
94, at 58 ff.; Battelli, Les institutions de la d~mocratie directe en droit Suisse et compar6
moderne (1933); Ruck, Schweizerisches Staatsrecht (i933); Sdcr~tan, L'initiative populaire
cantonale et Ia l6gislation de crise (1934).

See E.F. io68.r4-r6 (d'Ernst).
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under a liberal-democratic form of government which is neither parliamentary nor presidential, has enjoyed an unparalleled equilibrium between executive and legislative power, strengthened by the integration
of direct popular action into the law-making process. The Federal Council (Bundesrat) is not responsible to the Federal Parliament (Bundesversammlung). On the basis of this semi-representative system the position
of the government was neither weakened by the fact that it is elected by
the parliament, nor was its prestige affected when the people rejected a
government proposal by referendum. A government of real experts and
not of party politicians, holding their office by customary re-election over
long periods, it is perhaps the most stable existing today. It used to give
effective executive leadership without being able to force its will upon
parliament and people if they were disinclined to follow the lead.
Yet Switzerland, in these years of economic and political tension, also
paid the tribute to the universal tendency of increased governmental
powers. This aim could be reached only by stretching almost beyond recognition the liberal constitution which the government deemed insufficient for coping with the crisis. The practice adopted in recent years involves both curtailment of legislative powers of the parliament and of
popular participation in the legislative and constituent processes which is
so conspicuous a feature of Swiss constitutional life. First, the Federal
Parliament conferred upon the Federal Council, by way of sweeping delegation, the right to issue ordinances having the validity of ordinary statutory enactments. Enabling clauses of this kind, particularly when contained in a so-called "urgent resolution of the Federal Council"' ° were
frequently vague and confined merely to setting up a general frame within
which the Federal Council could move with more or less discretion. In
the exercise of such delegations the Federal Council did not shy even from
violations of the constitutional provisions proper 0 9 which otherwise
could be modified only by popular referendum. Only in rare instances the
Federal Assembly has reserved for itself the right of repealing such governmental measures. In addition, the Federal Council extended the power of
issuing police ordinances granted by the constitution""° far beyond the
108 Article 89, alinea 2.
109Giacometti,

op. cit. supra note 107, at 62 ff. Even the Resolution of the Federal Council

of September 27, 1936 concerning measures which decreed the devaluation of the Swiss franc
had no legal justification in an enabling clause of a previous act as it was contended by the
Federal Council (see Id. at 69). Be it noted that in France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia devaluation was introduced by parliamentary statute. The last devaluation of April, 1938, was
imposed by decree.
110Article 102, no. 8-io.
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scope of the original provision."' In such cases, however, the government seeks not infrequently legalization through subsequent ratification
by the parliament. As regards the popular participation in legislation, the
urgency clause of the constitution was applied so readily in recent years
that this institution, intended by the constitution to be a real emergency valve for enactments which cannot be postponed lest acute danger
for the state would arise, became an almost regular feature of ordinary
legislation in Switzerland. Under the conditions of real urgency, the
Federal Council, conjointly with the Federal Parliament, may take care
of a pressing situation by way of the "urgent resolution of the Federal
Council" ("dringlicherBundesratsbeschluss") without waiting for the result of a popular referendum which otherwise must be held at the request
of 30,000 voters."12 This practice which competent observers have correctly characterized as "parliamentary dictatorship" or rather more as outright authoritarian, has made deep inroads in the constitution based on
the principles of popular initiative and referendum" . 3 because urgency, in
itself an unequivocal term, has been determined usually only on grounds
of the general necessity of a measure and not whether the enactment
could possibly not be postponed until the people had decided. Furthermore, such urgent resolutions of the Federal Council have cut even into
the constituent powers of the people"14 by excluding popular ratification
of constitutional amendment prescribed by the constitution. The real
reason for the flagrant misuse of the urgency clause is that parliament and
government evidently mistrust the soundness of the people and public
opinion. Consequently, a tension between voters and government has
arisen which is apt to undermine the sense of legality and the confidence
in constitutional processes.
There is little doubt among Swiss constitutional lawyers that the actual
ascendancy of the government over parliament and people is unconstitutional because it amounts to the obliteration and actual abolition of the
separation of powers on which the Swiss constitution is grounded."-, Once
more the doctrine, conceived, in past times, as the foundation of liberalism, has become a myth in the light of the authoritarian tendencies of
today which did not halt even before the cradle of European democracy.
M'
Giacometti, op. cit.

supranote 107, at 72 ff.
See Fleiner, op. cit. supra in note 24, at 404; Giacometti, op. cit. supra note 107, at 46
ff. Sulzer, Der allgemein verbindliche Bundesbeschluss nach Artikel 89 BV.
in

"13

Giacometti, op. cit. supra note 107, at 46.

"14

Id. at 58 ff.

XZS
Id. at 74 ff. Verordnungsrecht und Gesetzesdelegation 31 ff. (I928).
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In Switzerland supremacy of the executive was won by dearly extraconstitutional methods. It seems unlikely that a return to the pre-crisis
normalcy is possible in the near future. The legitimate way back to legality, if not to a full restoration of liberalism as implied in the separation of
powers, is the direct reform of the constitution which is bound to come
since public opinion is more and more resentful of the high-handed methods of a government justly suspected of authoritarian leanings. Such a
reform should bring the constitution in line with the actually existing
supremacy of the executive by conferring upon the Federal Council legitimate powers for more expeditious action in emergency situations together
with the establishment of constitutional review of federal acts. It is significant, however, that the Swiss people are slower than other nations in
realizing the needs of constitutional reform because of the deeply rooted
liberal traditions of the middle classes. This is clearly evidenced by the
results of two recent popular initiatives for constitutional reform which
both have failed to reach their objectives.- 6
TRIUMPH OF MONTESQUIEU: T E PROBLEM OF POLITICAL

CONTROL FOR THE SAKE OF LIBERTY

In concliding this skeleton survey of the relations between the legislative and the executive power as they exist today, a forecast, on the basis
of already visible trends, of possible future developments may be permitted. Constitutional history evidently moves in rising and descending
curves. The eighteenth century ideologues who believed in the feasibility
of transforming the metaphysical concept of "the will of the people" into
practical institutions and workable formulas, have been bitterly disproved. The intrinsic changes of the technological age did not fail to
affect deeply the methods and processes of government. During the twenty years since the world war state interventionism has progressed by rapid
strides. In the field of government as in private life, liberty had to be
sacrificed for efficiency. For this reason, in dictatorial states predominance of the executive is perhaps considered less as tyranny or despotism
than as the necessary offset of the decay of individual self-determination
which, in this revolutionary age, has been made responsible for political
chaos and economic disturbances. Even in states still loyal to constituu6 The initiative for a total revision of the constitution, sponsored in 1934 by the "renewal
movement," a group of disguised fascists, young conservatives, Catholics and disgruntled
shopkeepers, was rejected by a vast majority of the voters and the cantons in 1935. Likewise
the Socialist "crisis initiative" which intended to equip the Federal Council with far-reaching
extraordinary powers for dealing with economic legislation, was rejected in 1935 by a majority
of voters and cantons.
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tional processes the merger between governmental and legislative powers
reflects the increasing difficulties of a capitalistic society which everywhere is travelling fast on the road toward planned economy. It is doubtful whether, under the system of private capitalism, planning can be
achieved by voluntary cooperation of private interests, as foreshadowed,
perhaps, to some extent by the development of various Boards and administrative agencies of economic self-government in England and elsewhere,"17 or only by compulsion applied by the government which ultimately cannot but lead to state capitalism. At any rate, the classical task
of the parliament, namely, law-making by deliberation and sanction, has
been overriden by the need of swift decision which only a small body of
men is suited to perform. The tenaciously upheld postulate of a separation of legislative and executive (or administrative) action is unrealistic,
obsolete and may become at times even dangerous. Hence the unavoidable concentration of political action, whether legislative or administrative, in the hands of the government.
The crucial issue, therefore, in constitutional states is the integration
of the increased powers of the government to decide and to act into the
general system of political control by the people. For this function the
parliament, as the freely elected organ of the sovereign nation, is by all
means more indispensable than ever. No better or equally appropriate
method of supervision has been devised. In other words: the real problem is how governmental leadership through action can be subordinated
to the political control by parliament. Political control in this sense means
both appointment and revocation of the government by constitutional
processes and, in addition, the continuous scrutiny of governmental action by the representatives of the people. Here emerges the fundamental
tenor of Montesquieu's doctrine. The technical appliances of the constitution must serve the reconciliation of leadership with freedom, lest leadership would destroy freedom. Very rarely the "will of the people" can be
expressed in a facile formula or in terms of concrete proposals. But the
people can prevent the government from effacing their will. Political
leadership means: "I am their leader, therefore, I follow them."" 8 The
constitution is the rationalized system of controls over the government
by the people for the sake of liberty. Our own experience clearly vindi117 On this development which has parallels in Belgium and in Switzerland, see Robson,
Public Enterprise (1937). See also Bretha de la Gressaye, La repr6sentation professionnelle et
corporative, Revue philosophique de droit 59 ff.(I934); Bonnard, op. cit. supra note 67.

rig This happy phrase, coined by Carlyle, is borrowed from Jennings, op. cit. supra note 82,
at 364.
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cates the immortal wisdom of Montesquieu's thesis that leadership when
uncontrolled, abuses its powers and degenerates into despotism styled
now-a-days dictatorship or totalitarianism. Division of powers with its
attendant checks and balances, another term for control, implies, in the
last analysis, the preservation of political liberty even when the technical
arguments for such division of functions are no longer valid.
Thus the immediate objectives of the future technique of government
in constitutional states are twofold. On the one hand, rational methods
must be discovered and guarantees must be devised by which the constitutional machinery brings real leaders as experts, and not only expert
politicians and demagogues to the top. This is the problem of rationalized
control of mass emotionalism, involving, temporarily perhaps, some revisions of traditionally revered standards of equalitarian concepts." 9 In
the second place, while the government thus entrusted with power does
what governments have to do, namely to govern, a rationalized method
has to be found of how governmental leadership should be made amenable
to political control of the people or their representatives. This implies
evidently a revision of the technical functions of representative assemblies.120 Relieved of their burden of actual participation in the conduct
of the business of the government the parliaments can become true and
efficient agencies of political control. It may be hoped that from this new
division of functions and powers a new balance of political forces will
emerge more in conformity with realities than the present myth of the
balance between legislative and executive power. Such an arrangement of
weights and counter-weights should serve for the tasks of directed
economy in the technological age, and, at the same time, it would be better
adjusted to the ultimate end of all and every political organization:
Political freedom.
119 Loewenstein, op. cit. supra note 27, at 656 ff. For the elaborate efforts, in all European
democracies, to check emotional propaganda entertained by political parties for subversive

purposes see the extensive study of Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political Extremism
in European Democracies, 38 Col. L. Rev. 591 ff. (1938).
120For attempts directed toward this end see, e.g., Czechoslovakia, laws of May 30, 1933
(Slg. no. 88, 89), Annuaire de l'Institut de droit public 1934 748 ff. (1935); Belgium: Regulation of the procedure of the Chamber of Deputies of December 5, 1935 (Informations constitutionnelles et parlementaires [no. i of February i5, 1936, 4 if-]).

